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Abstract 
This thesis studies determinants of defaults experienced in the Norwegian High Yield bond 
market from 2006 to 2013. This is done by finding defaulted issuers from the bonds registered 
in the Norwegian Trustees database Stamdata. The information about defaulted and non-
defaulted companies is coupled with financial and other characteristics available at the time 
of the bond issue.  
From a univariate assessment, the typical issuer that defaulted in the Norwegian High Yield 
bond had lower profits relative to their debt already before issuance, was significantly smaller 
than a non-non defaulted issuer, the issue had higher coupon rates adjusted for the level of 
interbank interest rates, and the issued amount was higher relative to the issuer’s total assets. 
Of the defaults found in the final sample of 176 issuers, 35 of the 59 (59%) observed defaults 
involved issuers that founded their companies less than six years from the issue year. Some of 
the rather surprisingly results regarding the liquidity ratios and the book equity ratio must be 
seen in connection with the relative high amount of start-up firms defaulting. Logistic 
regressions were carried out with default as the dependent variable using the variables in the 
SEBRA-basic bankruptcy prediction model developed by the Central Bank of Norway. The 
model performs decent when classifying the non-defaulted companies, but breaks down when 
classifying the defaulted companies. The logistic regressions back up the conclusions from the 
univariate analysis regarding profits relative to debt level, the size of the company, and that a 
start-up firm are more prone to default on their bond issues than more matured companies. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I would like to thank my supervisor Aksel Mjøs for answering important questions, and for 
providing critical reviews throughout the whole process. Thanks to the Norwegian Trustee for 
giving me access to their database Stamdata. I would also like to thank Jonas Osland at Gabler 
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providing me with literature and tips where to look for data. Thanks to the Holberg Funds for 
sending me introductory information from presentations held about the Norwegian High Yield 
bond market. I would also like to thank my family and those around me for putting up with, a 
sometimes, frustrated student. Writing a thesis about the Norwegian High Yield bond market 
is certainly a challenge, especially when it comes to gathering sufficient data. 
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1. Introduction 
What factors are important when explaining why certain issuers in the Norwegian High Yield 
bond market experience financial distress, and later default on their bond issues? Could 
investors identify especially risky firms when they lack updated credit rating information? Do 
we find some characteristics about the issuers that can provide warning signs that are available 
when the investor choose, or choose not to participate in a new bond issue? Are the markets 
participants aware of the risks involved in High Yield bonds? These are some of the questions 
that thesis tries to answer. 
Recent Master thesis’s at NHH have provided studies on performance of the Norwegian High 
Yield bond market (Bakjord and Berg, 2012), determinants of the outcomes of financial 
distress (Knapstad and Skarvøvik, 2012), and studies of recovery rates (Brekke and Haugland, 
2010). Since the major credit rating agencies assign ratings to a small part of the issuers in the 
Norwegian market, it is of interest to dig into which type of High Yield issuers that is more 
likely to experience financial distress and subsequently default on their bond issues. 
The lack of transparency and public available data was both encouraging and challenging 
when writing a thesis about the Norwegian Bond market. The Norwegian Fund and Asset 
Management Association is currently collaborating with the Norwegian Trustee to form a new 
company, Nordic Bond Pricing (2013). Nordic Bond Pricing shall deliver a weekly pricing 
service based on all the bonds listed and traded in the Norwegian bond market. The formation 
of Nordic Bond Pricing implicitly shows that it is costly for investors to update prices and 
measure to the risk of their portfolios when many bonds trade infrequently. The formation of 
Nordic Bond Pricing, as well as the experienced growth in the Norwegian corporate bond 
market, makes credit risk, with this market as a platform, an interesting subject to dig further 
into. 
The corporate bond market in Norway is likely to continue to grow and strengthen its influence 
as a source of capital for both domestic and foreign companies. The main reason for this 
expected development is the legislation put forward by the Norwegian government that 
requires banks to hold more equity capital behind their lending activities. This could cause 
Norwegian banks to be more careful with lending to the more risky firms, which causes these 
firms to obtain cheaper financing in the corporate bond market (Halvorsen, 2013) than through 
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bank borrowing. This possible evolution also warrants a better understanding of credit risk 
from a Norwegian market perspective. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to provide evidence from the Norwegian High Yield 
market that can help investors in doing the default risk analysis when credit ratings are absent. 
This is done by collecting a sample of possible High Yield firms from the Norwegian Trustees 
database Stamdata. Defaulting and non-defaulting firms are identified and matched with 
information about the issuer available at the time of issuance.  
The choice to use information available at the issue date is made because many of the bonds 
in the Norwegian market trade infrequently, and because many investors hold their bonds to 
either maturity, or default occurs. A clear focus is given to what separates the defaulted 
companies from the non-defaulted companies in a quantitative way. It is worth to notice that 
a qualitative assessment of the issuers business, its primary product market, and the 
comparative advantages of the issuer have a place in the analysis of default risk. The content 
in this thesis is also relevant for companies that wish to use the corporate bond market for 
gaining access to debt capital, in that it can help new issuers to look into which type of issuers 
that have fallen into trouble historically.  
The structure of this thesis is the following: Chapter 2 gives a brief description of corporate 
bonds and bond markets in general. Chapter 3 gives an overview and description of central 
parts of the Norwegian corporate bond market. Chapter 4 examines bankruptcy- and default 
prediction literature. Chapter 5 describes the data gathering process. Chapter 6 discusses 
statistical methods used to analyse the final sample, while chapter 7 reports the findings and 
conclusion from the statistical analysis. 
  
 8
2. Bond theory 
This chapter will start with some basic bond theory, which provides the necessary background 
for the analysis of default risk. Different designs of bond contracts, credit ratings, and the 
difference between default and bankruptcy, are among the topics being covered.  
2.1 Bond basics 
2.1.1 Bond types 
A bond is a type of security that a borrower issues in connection with a borrowing 
arrangement. The borrower is selling bonds for cash directly to the investors instead of bank 
borrowing. Bonds are part of a wider asset class called fixed income securities. The principal, 
par value, or face value of the bond, is the amount that becomes due to the bondholder at the 
maturity date. A typical bond would obligate the borrower to pay semi-annual interest to the 
bondholder. An interest rate, called the coupon rate, multiplied by the principal amount 
determines the total interest payments owed to the bondholder. There is also a possibility for 
a floating interest rate on the bond. A floating rate bond links the coupon rate to a reference 
rate like the NIBOR1, or the LIBOR2 rate of interest. There are also bonds that do not pay any 
coupons before the maturity date. The investor’s return on these zero-coupon bonds occurs 
entirely because the bond is sold at a price below the face value (Bodie, Kane et al., 2011). 
Large issuers of bonds include governments, municipalities, government agencies, and 
corporations.  In the private sector, the purpose of a bond issue is to finance an investment at 
an interest rate lower than the rate of return on the investment. An issue can also have the 
purpose of changing the capital structure of the company, or as a financing arrangement for 
the daily operations of the business.  The most important difference between a corporate bond 
and a government bond, at least when the government is considered a solid debtor, is that the 
former exhibits default risk. An important aspect of bond financing is that the bondholder has 
a status of a creditor, unlike an equityholder, who is in fact an owner of the corporation in 
                                                 
1 Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate. 
2 London Interbank Offered Rate. 
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which he holds stocks. This fact, and because a bond promises a fixed stream of payment, 
generally makes bonds less risky than equity (Martellini, Priaulet et al., 2003).  
Corporate bond markets can be quite illiquid opposed to equity and other securities markets. 
The borrower can apply for listing at a bond exchange to improve the liquidity of the issue. In 
the US corporate bond market, most bonds trade over-the-counter (OTC) by a network of 
dealers, linked together by quotation system. Even bonds that are listed on the largest 
centralized bond market, NYSE3 Bonds, trade mostly in the OTC market. The dealers do not 
carry bonds in their inventories and instead tries to match a possible seller with a possible 
buyer, when a sale or buy order is registered. This makes the market for some issues very thin, 
and makes liquidity a major risk factor when investing in corporate bonds (Bodie, Kane et al., 
2011). 
2.1.2 Bond pricing 
The basis for pricing a simple coupon bond is given by the present value formula: 
𝑃 = ∑
𝐶
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
+
𝐹𝑉
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛
 
Where 𝑃 is the price of the bond, 𝐶 is the coupon payment, 𝐹𝑉  is the face value of the bond, 
𝑛 is the number of payment dates measured in years, and r is the appropriate discount rate for 
the bond.  
The yield to maturity (YTM) is the constant discount rate, which makes the present value of 
the promised cash flow equal to the price of the bond: 
𝑃 = ∑
𝐶
(1 + 𝑌𝑇𝑀)𝑡
+
𝐹𝑉
(1 + 𝑌𝑇𝑀)𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
A simple numerical example will illustrate how the probability of default and the loss to the 
investor in case of default, affects the price of the bond. Since the yield to maturity is the 
constant discount rate that makes the present value of payments equal to its current price, it 
                                                 
3 New York Stock Exchange. 
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follows that the bonds yield will also change due to a change in the perceived probability of 
default, and the severity of a possible default: 
Consider, for the purpose of simplicity, a risk free zero coupon. The price of the bond is 
currently 95.2381 one year before the principal of 100 becomes due. The yield of the bond is 
currently equal to the risk free rate of 5%. If investors instead now believe that it exists a 50% 
probability that the payment in one year only will come in at 50, the risk adjusted expected 
cash flows to the investors in one year is: 
𝐸(𝐶𝐹) = 0,5 ∙ 100 + 0,5 ∙ 50 = 75 
Since this cash flow is risk adjusted, and the systematic risk of the bond is assumed zero, we 
can still discount the bonds cash flow by the risk-free rate of 5%: 
𝑃 =
75
1 + 5%
= 71,4286 
Consequently, the yield to maturity of the bond will change according to equation 2): 
71,4286 =
100
1 + 𝑌𝑇𝑀
, 𝑌𝑇𝑀 =
100
71,4286
− 1 = 40% 
We see from the simple example that changes in the credit risk of the borrower affects the 
price of bonds and make yields volatile. The example above is off course simplified. In reality, 
many factors affect the price and yields of bonds. Some of the factors that one need to consider 
when valuing a bond is the contractual feature of the bond indenture, the liquidity of the issue, 
and the rate of return one can achieve on investments of similar systematic risk. However, 
when things start to get more complicated, it is useful to keep in mind the basic relationship 
between the price of a bond and its yield.  
2.1.3 Contractual features of bonds 
Below follows a description of several features that are especially important when it comes to 
understanding and valuing corporate bonds. The brief survey on contractual features 
concentrates on expressions, and contract specifications, that one typically encounter when 
analysing bonds in the Norwegian market. 
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Seniority and safety: Fabozzi (2013) describes the priority structure of different claims as the 
following rank, where senior secured debt is the safest claim in a default situation: 
1. Senior secured debt 
2. Senior unsecured debt 
3. Senior subordinated debt 
4. Subordinated debt 
If the debt claim is backed by specific collateral, other than the general earnings power of the 
firm’s assets, the debt is said to be secured. Similarly, debt not backed by a pledge of assets is 
referred to as unsecured. Subordinated debt ranks after claims that are more senior when 
distributing proceeds to creditors if the firm is liquidated. Subordinated debt can also be senior 
or junior within the subordinated class. Secured bank debt is generally the claim in a 
company’s capital structure that is on top of the priority rank. Similar, junior subordinated 
bonds is at the lower end of the priority scale (Håvik, 2012). 
Convertible provisions: A convertible bond is a regular bond with a conversion right attached. 
The bondholder typically has the option to convert the face value of the bond into a specified 
number of common shares in the issuing corporation. The bondholder becomes upon 
conversion a shareholder, and the price the bondholder is paying is effectively the face value 
of the bond divided by the number of shares that the bondholder gets upon conversion. This 
price is referred to as the conversion price. Commonly, borrowers issue convertible bonds 
deep out of money, meaning that the face value of the bond is greater than the market value of 
the common stocks that the bondholder gets if converting the issue. Consequently, a 
convertible bond can be thought of as a regular bond plus a package of warrants4 (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2011). 
Put Provision: A put provision gives the bondholder the right to sell the issue back to the issuer 
for par at a specified date. This kind of provision is beneficial for the bondholder, because if 
interest rates have risen since the issue date, the bondholder is to receive par value, and can 
reinvest the proceeds in securities that promise higher coupon payments (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2011). 
                                                 
4 Warrants are similar to stock options, except that they are written on new stocks of the issuer. 
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Callable provisions: A call feature gives the issuer the right to repurchase the bond before the 
maturity date. The price is usually equal to face value plus a call premium that compensates 
the bondholder for the loss of interest. In a new issue, there often exists a grace period where 
the issuer cannot redeem the bond. The call feature is valuable for the issuer because if interest 
rates have fallen, or if the credit assessment of the company has improved, the company can 
refinance its debt and thus lower its future interest payments. The bondholder receives a 
disadvantage if the bond exhibits a call feature for three reasons: The cash flow structure is 
not known with certainty, the buy and hold investor is now exposed to reinvestment-risk, and 
the potential for price increases will be limited because the price will not rise much above the 
call price (Fabozzi, 2013). 
Covenants: Covenants are restrictions on the borrower’s future actions or performance that is 
explicitly included in the bond’s indenture. Covenants can be either affirmative or negative. 
An affirmative covenant requires the borrower to do certain things to honour the loan 
agreement, while a negative covenant prohibits the borrower from actions that benefits 
shareholders at the expense of the bondholder. It is either common that the indenture specifies 
some limits to the absolute debt level outstanding, or that the indenture specifies a ratio in 
which the company’s debt level must comply. Performance ratios, and restrictions on allowed 
dividends are also common covenants included in the bond indenture (Bodie, Kane et al., 
2011). One common negative covenant in the Norwegian bond market is a negative pledge 
covenant, which prohibits the borrower from the pledging its assets to a new lender in a way 
that alters the security of the specific bond in which the negative pledge clause is included 
(Fabozzi, 2013). 
Special High Yield bond features: In the High Yield bond market, many firms issue bonds to 
finance leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and to recapitalize (Fabozzi, 2013). Some of these 
financing arrangements provide high debt levels that make the interest payment burden 
substantial. To reduce interest payments, these bonds sometimes exhibit deferred coupon 
structures. There are three common kinds of deferred coupon structures: Deferred-interest 
bonds, step-up bonds, and payment-in kind (PIK) bonds. Deferred-interest bonds do not pay 
interest for an initial period from the issue date. Step-up bonds pay coupons that grow with 
the under the bond’s life. A payment in kind (PIK) provision gives the issuer the option to pay 
interest and instalments in cash, or issue new bonds to the bondholders with a face value equal 
to the payment that is due. 
 13 
One can see from the discussion on various bond characteristics that bonds, and other debt 
instruments, are generally complex securities. It is therefore important to factor in the specifics 
of the debt contract for both credit assessments and for valuation purposes. 
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2.2 Credit risk and credit ratings 
Credit risk can be divided into to three distinct risk categories: default risk, credit spread risk, 
and downgrade risk. Since this thesis concentrates on default risk, the description will mainly 
centre on this type of risk factor. This part will also cover a description of the credit ratings 
that participants in the bond market use as relative indicators of credit risk. 
2.2.1 Credit spread and default risk 
Credit spread: The credit spread is the difference in yields between a treasury security and the 
yield of a security that is similar in all other ways except for its credit quality. The yield on the 
treasury security serves as a proxy for the riskless rate. The spread is supposed to measure the 
required compensation that the investor requires to bare the credit risk of the issue. 
Fisher (1959) was the first to investigate the determinants of the risk premiums observed on 
corporate bonds. His hypothesis was that the risk premium depended on the liquidity of the 
bonds, and on the risk that the borrower will default. He measured the risk of default by three 
variables: A variable that measures the variation in the net earnings of the borrower5, the length 
of time the firm had been operating without forcing its creditors to incur a loss, and the ratio 
of the market value of equity to the par value of the firm’s debt. As a proxy for the bond’s 
liquidity, he used the market value of all the bonds the firm has outstanding. With the help of 
these four variables, Fisher tried to explain the variation in the cross section of observed risk 
premiums on three different trading days. Fisher defined the risk premium to be the difference 
between the yield to maturity of the corporate bond and the yield to maturity of a treasury 
security of the same maturity. Fisher was able to explain 81,1 % of the variation in corporate 
bond spreads by his independent variables for the entire estimation sample, which was made 
up by 366 observations.  
Fridson and Garman (1998) examine the determinants of credit spreads of newly issued High 
Yield bonds. They find that the spread on newly issued bonds is sensitive to quantifiable 
characteristics of the issue, and conditions prevailing in the financial markets around the time 
of the issue. Some of the factors that the authors find to contribute to a higher credit spread 
                                                 
5 The coefficient of variation in the net earnings of the issuer from the last 9 years. 
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are longer maturity, if a first time issuer issues the bond, and if the bond is callable until 
maturity. When it comes to the market environment, the spread is likely to be higher if the 
secondary market spreads between BB rated bonds and B rated bonds are higher, and if the 
yields on Treasury bonds rose the month before the issue date. The authors are able to explain 
56% of the variance in spreads by variation in their covariates. 
Default risk: can be defined as the risk that the borrower is not able to make timely payments 
of interest and principal to honour the debt obligation of the issue (Fabozzi, 2013). Expected 
default loss is one way one can calculate the default risk component. The formula for expected 
loss is stated is: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝐷 ∙ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷 ∙ (1 − 𝑅𝑅) 
Where 𝑃𝐷 is the cumulative probability of default, and 𝑅𝑅 is the recovery rate given a default.  
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) examine the components of the credit spread by the use of 
Credit Default Swap(CDS)-spreads6, and reduced form credit models, as measures of default 
risk. They find that default risk accounts for the majority of observed credit spreads. The 
default risk component grows as one move down to bonds with lower credit ratings. The 
researchers also find that it exist important non-default components in observed credit spreads.  
Duffie and Singleton (2003) provide evidence that default rates depends strongly on the 
current state of the economy. The overall default rate is high when economic growth is low 
and correspondingly low when economic growth is high. As a concrete measure of the 
correlation between the business cycle and defaults, they measure the four-quarter moving 
average default rates, and compare this measure to GDP growth rates for a sample period from 
1983-1997. The correlation between the two measures over the period is -0.78, indicating a 
strong negative correlation between GDP growth rates and defaults.  
Ilmanen (2011) states that a reasonable recovery for senior debt is around 40%, but that it is 
important to remember that the recovery rate typically varies with time, seniority, and security.  
Typically, default rates and recovery rates move together in recession periods. The historical 
                                                 
6 Credit Default Swaps are derivative instruments that provides protection for default risk. 
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default rate has followed the High Yield-treasury spread quite close in the United States of 
America since 1978, with an average spread of about 5.30 % compared with an annual average 
default rate of 4.3 %. When factoring in the recovery rate, the average default loss over the 
period has been around 2.6 %, thus investors have realised about half of the promised credit 
spread. 
Sæbø (2011) examines credit spreads in the Norwegian market for the years 2008-2009. He 
identifies that roughly a quarter of the observed credit spreads from 2793 trades registered at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) is due to compensation for expected loss. He uses the 
expected default frequency (EDF) from the Moody’s Creditedge model, and uses fixed 
recovery rates assumptions for the sectors finance, utilities and industry, as estimates of the 
cumulative probabilities of default and expected recovery rates. He also examines which 
factors that can explain the variation in credit spreads beyond annualized expected loss. 
Among the factors, that Sæbø finds to explain credit spreads is the size of the issuer, the issuers 
sector, and a measure of the general liquidity level in the bond market. Sæbø also states that it 
is difficult to find a proxy for the liquidity of an individual bond, and that some of the size 
factor could in fact be attributable to a liquidity premium.   
2.2.2  Credit ratings 
The three major credit rating agencies; Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s 
Corporation (S&P), and Fitch Investors Service publish credit assessments of large 
corporations and sovereign issuers. The credit rating agencies assign a letter grade to each 
corporation, municipality, or sovereign issuer that is supposed to reflect their ability to make 
timely payment of interest and principal. Ratings are relative assessments of an issuer’s ability 
to honour the obligation of the bond indenture over a cycle. Moody’s states that, as a rule of 
thumb, they are looking through the next economic cycle, or longer, when rating an issuer. 
Consequently, poor short-term performance will not make Moody’s downgrade an issuer if 
they believe that the issuer will continue to maintain its credit quality in the future (Moody's, 
2013c). 
Below is a table of the rating scale that the two largest credit rating agencies, Moody’s, and 
S&P use for their publications of credit ratings. The description to the left of the table is 
Moody’s brief description of the quality and risk of the issuer. Moody’s modifies the ratings 
with the numbers 1, 2, 3 from rating Aaa to Caa, where 1 is off the highest quality. Similarly, 
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Standard & Poor’s use + and – to modify their ratings. Bonds issued by an entity rated below 
Baa (Moody’s), or below BBB (S&P), are commonly thought of as High Yield bonds7(Bodie, 
Kane et al., 2011). 
Table 1 Credit ratings 
 
Source: Moody’s (2013b) and Bodie, Kane and, Marcus (2011) 
Very few of the issuers in the Norwegian market have an official rating assigned by the three 
largest credit ratings agencies. This constitutes a problem when one need to define which 
bonds that is considered High Yield. Market participants and portfolio managers therefore rely 
on the ratings assigned to the issue by the credit analysts at various investment banks. The 
market participants commonly speak of these internal ratings as “shadow” ratings. There is 
currently no available database in Norway where one can find regularly updated information 
on “shadow” ratings. Some of the largest investment banks in Norway publish weekly credit 
reports that investors, and other asset management institutions, can subscribe to for updated 
credit assessments on some of part the market. However, unfortunately, the credit reports do 
                                                 
7 Sometimes speculative-grade bonds or junk bonds are used as a synonym for High Yield bonds. 
 Moody’s S&P Description 
Investment 
grade 
Aaa AAA Judged to be off the highest quality, subject to the lowest 
level of credit risk.  
 Aa AA Judged to be off high quality and are subject to very low 
credit risk. 
 A A Judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low 
credit risk. 
 Baa BBB Judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate 
credit risk and as such may possess certain speculative 
characteristics. 
High Yield Ba BB Judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial 
credit risk. 
 B B Considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. 
 Caa CCC Judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject 
to very high credit risk. 
 Ca CC Highly Speculative and are likely in, or very near, 
default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and 
interest. 
  C  
Default C D The lowest rated and are typically in default, with little 
prospect for recovery of principal or interest. 
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not show the big picture of the distribution of ratings. As an example, in the weekly credit 
report published by DNB Markets for week 35 (2013), only thirty-nine industrial companies 
were included with either an official rating, or an internal credit rating. 
In his book about expected returns, Ilmanen (2011) provides statistics that show that from 
1973 to 2009, BB rated bonds average excess return over treasury bonds are higher than lower 
rated bonds, and that the BB category is the top performing bond rating class. This is rather 
surprising from common financial theory, and shows to some extent that higher risk does not 
generally imply higher expected average returns if we look at how the various bond-rating 
classes have performed historically. One explanation for this phenomenon is that many bond 
investors, such as pension funds and low risk bond funds, are constrained to invest in 
Investment Grade (IG) bonds only. When an issue gets downgraded this means that the 
majority of the portfolio managers are forced to sell the newly downgraded High Yield bonds8. 
The sale of these fallen angels causes a market segmentation effect, which causes the price of 
these bonds to fall, and accordingly their yields to go up. 
2.2.3 Migration risk and credit spread risk 
For bonds with issuers rated Investment Grade, the probability of default is relatively low and 
the risk of a rating downgrade is the most relevant risk factor. Downgrade risk, or migration 
risk, is the risk that one or more of three major credit rating agencies assign a lower credit 
rating to an issuer, or an issuer’s debt obligation. Downgrades frequently leads to a widening 
of the credit spread, and subsequently to a capital loss. Credit spread risk refers to the risk that 
a bond’s price will fall due to the widening of the credit spread. A widening of the credit spread 
can also occur because the industry in which the issuer competes suffers a downturn, or if the 
investors in bond markets think that the general level of credit risk in the market has become 
worse. Thus, the underlying reasons for the widening of the credit spread are not necessarily 
captured by the ratings of the rating agencies (Fabozzi, 2013).  
                                                 
8 Bonds that are issued as Investment Grade and subsequently falls into the High Yield category are sometimes spoke of as 
fallen angels. 
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2.3 Definition of default 
When performing a study on defaults, one must have a clear opinion of what type of event that 
constitutes a default. For this thesis, the Moody’s definition of default from Moody’s 
Corporate Default Risk Service (2013a) was used when determining which bonds that had 
been involved in a credit event. Moody’s divides a default incident into three broad categories: 
1. A missed or delayed distribution of interest and/or principal, including payments made 
within a grace period. 
2. Bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks (perhaps by 
regulators) to the timely payment of interest and/or principal 
3. A distressed exchange occurs where: (i) the issuer offers debt holders a new security 
or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation (such as 
preferred equity or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount, lower 
seniority, or longer maturity; or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping 
the borrower avoid default. 
In defining the sample of defaulted bonds, the Moody’s definition of default is used to 
determine if the bond has experienced a default, and to distinguished between the three types 
of broad default categories that the Moody’s definition covers. The motivation to choose the 
Moody’s definition is because it is one of the broadest definitions available, and because it is 
possible to split observed defaults into the three categories above in an efficient manner.  
Cross default clauses refers to a situation in which the bond agreements states that if the issuer 
defaults on another borrowing arrangement, the bond would be in default and the face value 
of the bond immediately becomes due. The defaulted amount on the other borrowing 
arrangement is regularly required to be above a certain threshold before the other bonds of the 
issuer falls into default (Fabozzi, 2013). 
One example of a cross default situation from the Norwegian bond market is the default of the 
secured USD bond issued by the oil company Interoil Exploration and Production ASA. From 
the loan agreement the company had an obligation to pay an amount of 10 000 000 USD 
which, was due the 4th of May 2009. The company failed to honour this obligation and the 
Norwegian Trustee declared the bond into default and due for immediate payment. The issuer 
had also issued two unsecured Bonds, which according to a cross default clause in their loan 
agreements subsequently went into default.  
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2.4 Default versus bankruptcy 
From the Moody’s definition of default, one can immediately see that bankruptcy and 
liquidation are only two categories off possible credit events. Of the 160 defaults that were 
found in the preliminary sample of this thesis, only fourteen were defaults in which the first 
event was an event of either which consisted of a bankruptcy filing, by the company itself, or 
by its creditors. However, the outcome of several of the defaults was eventually bankruptcy 
and/or liquidation.  
One possible solution when the issuer default on the loan agreement is to restructure out of 
court by postponing obligations, reduce principal or interest, or by forming another 
restructuring mechanism which might include converting the whole or a part of the debt into 
equity. The bankruptcy incidents that were found in this thesis have mainly been Chapter 11 
filings in the United States, or the companies have filed for bankruptcy according to 
Norwegian law. If it is unlikely that an out of court restructuring will be successful, then either 
the company or its creditors files for bankruptcy petition9.   
In the United Sates the two most important chapters in the bankruptcy act, which includes 
fifteen different chapters, are Chapter 11 and Chapter 7. Chapter 11 is the most common form 
of bankruptcy and deals with the reorganization of the firm so that the firm can emerge from 
bankruptcy as a going concern. When in Chapter 11, the corporation receives protection from 
creditors who seek to collect their claims, and continue their daily operations. The purpose of 
the process is to put forth a reorganization plan for the company so that the company can 
continue its business, and that each creditor is treated fairly. If the bankruptcy court, and the 
creditors, do not deem the reorganization plan acceptable, the court may force a chapter 7 
liquidation of the firm. 
Chapter 7 deals with the liquidation of the company. When liquidating a company, the 
company cease to exist, and its assets are sold to cover the claims of the creditors. The 
distribution rules to creditors shall comply with the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority 
rules states that senior creditors are to be paid in full before the junior creditors receives any 
                                                 
9 When the company files for bankruptcy, it is referred to as a voluntary bankruptcy filing. When the creditors file for 
bankruptcy, it is referred to as an involuntary bankruptcy filing.  
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payment. This priority rule grants both secured and unsecured creditors priority over the 
shareholders of a company in the case of liquidation (Fabozzi, 2013). 
Although Norway has a bankruptcy legislation similar to Chapter 11 in the United States, it is 
of little use, and companies tend to restructure out of court when default is unavoidable. In 
Norway, the company needs to both insolvent and insufficient, for a full opening of bankruptcy 
and/or liquidation. Insolvent means, by Norwegian law, that the company is not able to pay its 
obligations when their obligations are due. Insufficient means that the value of the company’s 
liabilities exceeds the value of its assets. Bankruptcy proceedings is initiated by an application 
to the probate court, and both insolvency and insufficiency must be documented (Gisvold, 
2012).  
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3. The Norwegian corporate bond market 
In this chapter, the Norwegian corporate bond market is introduced by going through some 
general characteristics, the exchanges which these bonds trade, and the role of the Norwegian 
Trustee. Bonds registered in the Norwegian Trustees database Stamdata is used as a starting 
point to define the Norwegian corporate bond market.  
3.1 Market description 
Figure 1 below shows issued amount in billion NOK over the years 2005 and 2012, of regular 
bonds and convertibles. The industries banking, energy and utility, insurance, and the public 
sector are left out of the figures. Issues made by corporations that are government guaranteed 
and owned by the government, are left out the figures as well. Thus, the figures give an 
overview of issued amount in the corporate bond segment over the period. We see that most 
of the bonds issued are regular bonds, but that does not mean that the contractual features are 
simple. There are still a myriad of different structures on the issued bonds including deferred 
coupon structures, different bond covenants, and the bonds being callable in some part of the 
bond’s tenor.  
Figure 1 Issued amount by year and issue type 
 
Source: Stamdata statistics 
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Figure 2 shows total issued amount in billions NOK registered in Stamdata per year from the 
period 01.01.2005 to 31.12.2012. The figure also shows the growth rate from year to year in 
issued amount. The cumulative average growth rate in issued amount per year (CAGR) for 
this part of the bond market has been 15.4%, but we see that the growth rate in issued volume 
has varied a lot over the years. As can be seen, there were high issue volumes coming up to 
the financial crisis period of late 2008 and 2009. During the financial crisis, few bonds were 
issued, but the market regained and passed its 2006 volume already in 2009. 
Figure 2 Issued amount and growth 2005-2012 
 
Source: Stamdata statistics 
Figure 3 shows which industries that dominate the market, using the industry classification 
assigned in the Stamdata database. Not surprisingly, issues made by the oil and shipping 
industry dominate the issues of corporate bonds in Norway. These industries are capital heavy 
industries, and industries that generally dominate the business landscape of Norway. Oil- and 
shipping companies also dominate the equity market at the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
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Figure 3 Issued amount by industry 2005-2012 
 
Source: Stamdata statistics 
Figure 4 shows total issued amount split up by the investment bankers that acted as a managers 
when designing and marketing these issues to investors. 
Figure 4 Bond managers 2005-2012 
 
Source: Stamdata statistics 
As we can see, Pareto Securities is by far the dominant manager in the Norwegian bond 
market, with a market share of 34%. DNB Markets and ABG Sundal Collier follow with 
market shares of 12 %. It is also worth noting that ABG Sundal Collier has specialized on 
convertible bonds and has the leading role in this sub-segment. 
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3.2 Listing of bonds in Norway 
In Norway, there exist two exchanges where bonds and other fixed income securities are listed 
for trading, at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), or at the Nordic Alternative Bond Market 
(ABM). In addition, Norwegian issuers may also list their bonds abroad. 
Oslo Stock Exchange is a regulated marketplace according to EUs MiFID10 directive, making 
the listing process on OSE more comprehensive than the listing process on the ABM exchange. 
OSE requires the lender to make a prospectus according to EU-law, and the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway must approve the prospectus before the issue is available 
for trading. The issuer is also obliged to use International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) when preparing its annual accounts.  
On the other hand, the Nordic Alternative Bond Market is an unregulated marketplace where 
the rules of the exchange adjust to the demands of the market participants. The listing process 
is quicker and easier, and the issuer is not obliged to use IFRS in their annual reports (Oslo 
Børs, 2013). The process for listing is thus faster, and requires less documentation from the 
issuer, which cause some foreign firms that finds the process in their home country tedious to 
use the Norwegian corporate bond market as a source of capital of instead. Some see this as 
an undesired evolution, which causes the average credit quality of the borrowers in the 
Norwegian market to go down. As an example, the well-known portfolio manager Peter 
Warren is cited by the online business newspaper E24 (2012) that he do not see it as a positive 
sign that foreign companies issue bonds in the Norwegian High Yield bond market because of 
little documentation requirements. Another concern according to Warren is that investors in 
the Norwegian High Yield bond market, in many cases, do not require official credit ratings 
on the issues. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution in outstanding amount by year-end from 2005 and 2012 at the 
OSE exchange and the ABM exchange. We can see that the ABM exchange has taken good 
share of the listings since its inception in 2005. 
                                                 
10 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. 
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Figure 5 Year-end volume OSE and ABM 2005-2012 
 
Source: Oslo Stock Exchange Annual Statistics (2013) 
There is also a possibility that the bonds registered in Stamdata trades on a foreign exchange. 
However, in the preliminary sample of this thesis, none of the bonds were reported as being 
listed on a foreign exchange. The bonds were either listed, delisted, should apply for listing 
later, had applied for listing, or were not supposed to apply for listing in Oslo or abroad. To 
get a sense of which investors who hold bonds on the OSE exchange, figure 6 shows the 
percentage distribution of different investors in corporate bonds listed at the OSE.  
Figure 6 Ownership structure OSE 2012 
 
Source: Oslo Stock Exchange Annual Statistics (2013) 
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The investors in the bond market are generally institutional investors like pension funds and 
bond mutual funds. We also see that foreign investors are by far the biggest investors in listed 
bonds at the Oslo Stock Exchange, followed by bond funds, insurance & private pension funds, 
and regular companies. Thus, the bond market in Norway is certainly a global market, and 
bonds are being sold to investors all over the world. If we look at the ownership structure at 
the ABM exchange we find a similar structure, expect that insurance & private pension funds 
have a bigger share together with foreign investors at around twenty-five to twenty-six percent. 
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3.3 Norwegian Trustee and Stamdata 
The main purpose of the Norwegian Trustee is to act as a trustee in the Norwegian fixed 
income securities market (Sandvik, 2010). The company is organized as a private enterprise 
owned by Norwegian banks, life insurance companies, and investment funds. The Group, 
Norwegian Trustee, has subsidiaries in Denmark, Finland, and in Sweden. The trustee 
monitors that the issuer complies with covenants in the bond agreement, that the issuer makes 
scheduled payments in time, and acts as an information channel between the issuer and 
bondholders. The trustee can also take legal actions against the borrower if the borrower does 
not act according to the bond agreement, and discusses matters with the borrower when there 
is no a need for a bondholders meeting. An advantage of using the Norwegian Trustee from 
the perspective of the issuer is that the borrower can negotiate with one party rather than 
approaching each individual bondholder, this process also makes it harder for a bondholder to 
steer a solution to his advantage if he has interests that are different from the other 
bondholders. There is no legal obligation to use a trustee when issuing a bond in the Norwegian 
market, but 95% of the issued volume currently have a trustee arrangement.  
Stamdata, which is a database owned and updated by the Norwegian Trustee, is the main 
source of data for this thesis. Stamdata is the leading provider of bond reference data in the 
Norwegian bond market. In Stamdata, one can find information covering loan documents, the 
letters that are sent from the trustee to the bondholders, and a large statistics service where one 
can extract information on all the issues and tranches registered in the database. Stamdata 
covers information on all the bonds, convertibles, and commercial papers where the 
Norwegian Trustee has the trustee role11, which compromises about 90% of the bonds 
registered in the security register in Norway. Pricing information is currently not included in 
the database, but may be included in the future with the establishment of Nordic Bond Pricing.  
  
                                                 
11 Some bonds where another institution has the trustee role are included in the database as well. 
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3.4 The Norwegian High Yield bond market 
The Bergen based asset management company the Holberg Funds, measures the current size 
of the corporate bond market in Norway to be around 300 billion NOK (2013). S&P, Moody’s, 
and Fitch, or credit analysts at the major Norwegian investment banks rate about half of the 
issues below Investment Grade according to the Holberg Funds. There is generally no agreed 
upon definition of the High Yield bond market in Norway because many issuers that certainly 
can be thought of as High Yield, lack credit ratings at all. Oil companies, offshore companies 
and shipping companies dominate the Norwegian High Yield market. Consequently, the lack 
diversification may be a concern when building a High Yield debt portfolio including only 
companies issuing bonds in the Norwegian market. 
A special characteristic of the Norwegian High Yield bond market compared to other more 
well-develop bond markets, is the high level of liquidity risk. Credit spreads are generally 
higher in Norway than in the global High Yield bond markets. One possible explanation for 
this difference is the presence of a substantial liquidity premium on a good part of the issues.  
Gabler (2012) notes that there is a tendency towards that the Norwegian High Yield market is 
used as a capital source primarily by publicly listed firms who needs to fund their daily 
operations. A few years ago, firms that needed project funding mainly used the market, and 
the uncertainty around their earnings and the value of the bonds were much higher than it is 
today. In the big issue year of 2007, almost half of the issues were rated CCC according to 
Gabler. Gabler also states that while the average credit quality in the High Yield bond market 
has gone down in the United States, it has improved in the Norwegian market as the market 
has matured in recent years. Another concern about the Norwegian market is the lack of an 
available benchmark index. It is therefore positive that Nordic Bond Pricing is thinking of 
establishing a reference index when they begin their pricing service in the future. 
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4. Prediction of distress. 
As noted by Marchisini, Perdue and Bryan (2004), although bankruptcy and default represent 
different phases of financial distress, it is still worth exploring the bankruptcy prediction 
models as a starting point when the purpose is to predict default on bonds. This chapter will 
include a description of the early bankruptcy models that use accounting and cash flow 
information, a brief overview of the background of the more theoretically motivated Merton-
model, and a description of the SEBRA-model used by the Central Bank of Norway for 
bankruptcy predicting purposes. 
4.1 Litterature review on bankrupcty prediction 
4.1.1 Statistical models 
Beaver (1966) was the first to perform a study of financial ratios as possible predictors of 
corporate bankruptcy. His sample was made up by financial statements for 79 firms, which 
had failed in the years 1954-1964 and had adequate financial data for the accounting year prior 
to the bankruptcy event. The sample of failed firms operated in 38 different industries. He then 
compiled a list of non-failed firms, which he paired with the failed firms according to industry 
and the size of their balance sheets. Beaver compared the means of several financial ratios for 
the failed firms and the non-failed firms, and tested if there were significant differences in the 
means of important financial ratios between the two groups. Beaver found that the ratio 
distribution of the failed firms deteriorated markedly as the firms approached failure. One of 
the ratios that Beaver found especially useful in separating non-failed firms from failed firms, 
was the cash flow to total-debt ratio. 
In 1968, Edward Altman (1968) developed the Z-Score by the help of multiple discriminant 
analysis as a tool for predicting corporate bankruptcy. An advantage of a multivariate analysis 
is that the interaction between the variables is taking into consideration. Multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA) is a statistical technique used to categorize an observation into several 
categories dependent on the characteristics of the specific observation. MDA tries to derive a 
linear equation which best discriminates between the categories. Altman’s sample was made 
up by 33 manufacturing companies that filed for bankruptcy petition during the years 1946-
1965. He then paired this sample with 33 companies of equal industries and size. Financial 
data was collected from the financial statements one reporting period prior to bankruptcy. 
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Altman collected twenty-two financial ratios, which were possible predictors of failure. Five 
of the ratios proved to be doing the best job in predicting corporate bankruptcy. The variables 
that Altman found to do the best job were working capital divided by total assets, retained 
earnings divided by total assets, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total 
assets, the market value of equity divided by the book value of total debt, and the ratio of sales 
divided by total assets. 
In 1977, Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) came up with a new model, the ZETA-
model, or the ZETA-score. 54 bankrupt firms, and 58 non-bankrupt firms, made up the sample 
from the period 1967-1975. The sample also covered larger firms than in the Z-score study, 
took into account recent advances in accounting rules, and included retailers as well as 
manufacturers. The independent variables in the ZETA-model are EBIT divided by total 
assets, stability of earnings12, EBIT divided by total interest payments, retained earnings 
divided by total assets, current assets divided by current liabilities, 5 year average market value 
of equity divided by total capital ,and the firms total assets. Altman and the co-authors found 
that the single most important variable to discriminate bankrupt firms from non-bankrupt firms 
was retained earnings to total assets.  
James A. Ohlson (1980) was the first to use logistic regression analysis to predict corporate 
bankruptcy using financial ratios. He argued that the use of a probabilistic measure of the risk 
of corporate bankruptcy is more useful than the Z-score derived by Altman because the 
estimated probability of bankruptcy is possible to interpret directly. Ohlson gathered financial 
data up to three years prior to the bankruptcy event for 105 bankrupt companies, and coupled 
this information with 2058 data points of non-bankrupt companies, from the years 1970-1976. 
Only industrial companies in the United States are analysed in Ohlson’s study. A requirement 
for the inclusion in his sample was that the equity of the firm had to be traded, either on a 
public exchange or in the OTC equity market. A list of nine independent variables were used 
to predict bankruptcy within one year, within two years given that the company did not file 
for bankruptcy in the subsequent year, and within one or two years from the financial 
information period. One important conclusion from Ohlson’s study is that the predictive power 
of any model depends on when the information used in the model is made available to the 
public. Ohlson only incorporates information that was available prior to the bankruptcy event 
                                                 
12 Measured by the standard error of estimate around a ten-year trend in EBIT divided by total assets. 
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when estimating his prediction model. He criticize previous bankruptcy predicting studies 
because they implicitly assume that the annual accounting information was available at the 
end of the fiscal year. This is not necessarily true because the company needs to prepare the 
financial statements, and an auditor needs to finish the audit process before the company 
releases the annual reports to the public.  
There is also models that tries to use a cash flow based approach for predicting corporate 
default. Aziz, Emanuel and Lawson (1988) use the Lawson identity13 to motivate the choice 
of independent variables. The researchers use both logistic regression analysis and multiple 
discriminant analysis within the same set of independent variables to predict corporate 
bankruptcy. They find that the Logit model performs marginally better compared to a multiple 
discriminant analysis approach for predicting bankruptcy one to five year before the event. 
Similarly, Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1985) use a flow of funds approach to predict failed 
and non-failed firms using multiple discriminant analysis, the Probit model, and the Logit 
model. The authors get the best predictive results using the Logit model on their sample of 
failed firms from 1970- 1981 in the United States.    
4.1.2 Structual models 
While there had been several models that used accounting ratios to predict the probability of 
default and bankruptcy, there was no general theory of pricing bonds when there is a 
significant probability that the bond would default before 1974. Robert C. Merton (1974) 
suggested that it is possible to use the option pricing formula proposed by Black & Scholes 
(1973) to price risky debt. Merton suggested that the levered equity of the firm could be valued 
as a call option on the firm assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of the required 
debt payment of the firm. This relationship occurs because the shareholders enjoys limited 
liability and that it is irrational, at least in theory, for the shareholders of the firm to pay off its 
debt when the asset value of the firm is below the value of the firms debt. Consequently, the 
bondholders are long the borrower’s assets and short a call option written on the borrower’s 
assets.  
                                                 
13 The identity says that the company’s total cash flow is the sum of the total cash flows to lenders and the total cash flows to 
shareholders, and splits this cash flow stream by its various origins. 
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Merton explicitly derives a formula for the valuation of risky zero-coupon bonds, and risky-
coupon bonds when the term structure of interest rates is given. By the help of relationships 
from the Black & Scholes option-pricing model, one can estimate the market value of the 
firm’s assets and its asset volatility with the help of information from equity markets. From 
the Merton-model the probability that the call option will expire out of the money can be 
derived, this is the risk neutral probability that the firm will default. When the value of the 
assets falls below the default point, the firm will default on their debt and the debt holders 
becomes the owners of the corporation. 
KMV Corporation, which Moody’s acquired in 2002, has extended the Merton model to 
become a standard for default-risk measurement. KMV has derived an ordinal measure of a 
company’s default risk named the distance to default (𝐷𝐷) (Kealhofer, 2003): 
𝐷𝐷 =
ln 𝐴 − 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑃𝑇 + (𝜇𝐴 −
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Where DD can be thought of as being roughly the number of standard deviations, (𝜎𝐴) the 
market value of the company’s assets (𝐴) is above the default point (𝐷𝑃𝑇) . The default point 
is the face value of the debt maturing at horizon (ℎ). If the market value of the company’s 
assets is lower than the face value of the company’s liabilities, the company defaults on its 
debt. 𝐷𝐷 is an ordinal measure of default and is not directly useful for valuation purposes in 
the sense that it only ranks companies default risk. KMV has been tracking defaults on all 
publicly traded companies in the United States since 1973, and uses their proprietary database 
to substitute the theoretical default probabilities on can derive from the Merton model with an 
empirical distribution of default rates from the KMV default database using the distance to 
default measure. Companies with similar DDs are predicted to have the same probability of 
default by the KMV-model. Differences between individual companies are accounted for by 
the estimated asset value, the volatility of the assets, and the company’s capital structure. The 
measure is not brought in as a covariate in this thesis, but provides a useful theoretical 
framework to keep in mind when analysing default risk.  
A clear problem with these models is that they only apply to publicly traded companies. One 
need the market value of equity, and the volatility of equity, to estimate the market value of 
the firm’s assets and the asset volatility. Both publicly traded companies and companies 
appears in the final sample of this thesis. Hence, there is not possible to derive a market-based 
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probability of default measure as an explanatory variable for the whole sample. Several 
researchers have used the distance to default as a covariate in studies of default risk. It has for 
example been used by Hillegeist et al. (2004) to compute the probability of bankruptcy, and 
by Das, Hanoun, and Sarin (2009) to explain the variation of the cross-section of CDS-spreads. 
4.2 Application to default on bonds 
Marchesini, Perdue, and Bryan (2004) examine how the most famous bankruptcy prediction 
models perform in predicting default on High Yield bond issues. They examine four different 
models which includes two accounting models: The Altman Z-score and Ohlson’s Logit 
model, and the two cash flow based models developed by Gentry, Newbold and Whitford 
(1985) and Aziz, Emanuel, and Lawson (1988). Their dataset consist of High Yield bond 
issues in the years 1997-2000 and defaults from the years 1997-2002. Of the 104 High Yield 
bonds in their sample, 44 bonds experienced a default before March 2002 and the remaining 
60 bonds were still viable traded assets. The result they obtain from the use of the bankruptcy 
models is discouraging. The best accuracy rate is obtained by the model developed by Gentry, 
Newbold, and Whitford, which had an accuracy rate for their sample of 61,5% one year before 
default. That is, 61,5 % of the issues were predicted to be in the correct category, defaulted, 
or non-defaulted. The authors also suggest a different model that is more suitable for predicting 
default on High Yield bonds. The model include six variables: the log of total assets, total 
equity divided by total assets, EBIT divided by sales, operating cash flow divided by sales, 
operating cash flow divided by total assets, and EBIT divided by interest expense. This model 
exhibits an accuracy rate applied to their sample of 79,6% one year prior to default, 72,6% 
two years prior to default, and 68,2% 3 years prior to default. 
Grammenos, Nomikos, and Papaostoulo (2008) estimate the probability of default for High 
Yield bonds in the shipping industry by using financial ratios and industry specific variables 
available at the time of issue. Fifty High Yield bonds issued in the period 1992-2004, whereas 
thirteen bonds that had defaulted by the end of 2004, make up their sample. The authors find 
that the key variables explaining default at issuance is a measure of gearing, the amount raised 
in the issue divided by total assets, working capital divided by total assets, retained earnings 
divided by total assets, and an industry specific variable that captures the shipping market 
conditions at the time of issuance. 
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This thesis mostly relates to the study of Huffman and Ward (1996). They use a sample of 171 
High Yield bond issues, including 54 bonds that defaulted during the period covered. The 
authors estimate a Logit model that uses financial ratios from the accounting year prior to the 
year of issuance. This is last available financial report before the respective bond issues. 121 
of the observations are used to estimate the parameters of the model, while a randomly selected 
holdout sample of 50 issues are used to explore the predictive capacity of the model. The 
variables that are found to indicate a higher default probability is a higher growth in total assets 
prior to issuance, larger changes in liquidity, a higher share of collateralized assets, and a 
smaller operating profit margin. The predictive power of their final model is higher compared 
with an alternative model that employs Altman’s original covariates. 
4.3 The SEBRA-model 
Eivind Bernhardsen (2001) at Norges Bank developed in his master thesis a model of 
predicting bankruptcy in Norway based on information from firm’s financial statements. 
Bernhardsen applies the logistic regression technique to accounting information from the 
SEBRA-database held by the Central Bank of Norway and couples the financial data with 
information about bankrupt firms in Norway. Dun and Bradstreet provided the bankruptcy 
data from the period 1990-1999. The model is the best-known model for predicting corporate 
bankruptcy in Norway and is a natural starting point for the choice of variables when 
performing credit risk analysis on Norwegian data. The dependent variable in the model is 
corporate bankruptcy within 3 years from the accounting year, given that the observed 
financial statement is the last reported statement of the firm. The model has been revised and 
improved over the years by researchers at the Central Bank of Norway and is primarily used 
to estimate the vulnerability of the banking sector.   
Although, the model is mainly used for estimating bankruptcy probabilities for Norwegian 
limited liability companies, it is interesting to see how the independent variables of the model 
performs when the purpose is to predict default on bonds and when foreign firms are included 
in the analysis. The latest available article describing the SEBRA-model, found in Economic 
Bulletin nr. 3 2007 (Bernhardsen and Larsen, 2007), is used as a starting point in the analysis 
section of this thesis. The different articles describing the SEBRA model over the years are 
also used. More will be said about the SEBRA-model in chapter five of this thesis.  
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5. Data 
In this chapter, the data gathering process is described. This process was a two-step process, 
first finding defaults and non-defaulted bonds in Stamdata, and second matching these 
observations with relevant accounting and market information. This chapter also includes a 
description of the variables tested as predictors of default, and descriptive statistics for the 
final sample. 
5.1 Stamdata 
From Stamdata, Issue based statistics was used as the starting point for finding High Yield 
firms14.To make the sample as large as possible, all issues from 01.01.1993-31.12.2012 were 
extracted from the database. However, to make the manual process of going through the loan 
documents manageable, the sample was narrowed down by filtering out issues that matured 
before 01.01.2005. This was also done because the Norwegian High Yield bond market was 
rather small prior to 2005. Issue types other than bonds were also filtered out, like commercial 
papers and warrants. Energy companies, companies classified to be in the public sector, banks, 
insurance companies, and other financial companies were excluded because these firms are 
not generally thought of as being part of the Norwegian corporate bond market. Issues made 
by firms were Stamdata reported the issuer to be owned by the government, to be an unlimited 
liability company, or issues that were categorized as government guaranteed, were also 
removed.  
A list of possible defaulted firms was received from the investment-consulting firm Gabler. 
This list was complemented with a list of defaulted firms found by Brekke and Haugland 
(2010) in their thesis, to create a list of possible defaults. Ninety-six companies appeared on 
this list before searching through Stamdata. As mentioned earlier, since few of the bonds in 
the Norwegian market have an official credit rating, it can be difficult to determine which 
issuers who are considered High Yield and which who are Investment Grade issuers. I had 
access to credit reports published by two Norwegian investment banks, but either the major 
rating agencies, or the respective investment banks had rated many of the firms that appeared 
                                                 
14 The alternative is Tranche-Based Statistics where each tranche registers separately. 
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in Stamdata. I decided to use the list of High Yield firms determined by Pareto Securities 
found in the thesis written by Brekke and Haugland to filter out Investment Grade issuers. 
Since this list was determined fall 2010, issuers that issued bonds after this period do not 
appear on the list. It is a risk that some of the issuers in the final sample are rated investment 
grade by some credit analysts. Nevertheless, when looking through the distribution of issuers, 
an approximation that these firms are High Yield issuers, seem reasonable. After the filtering 
process was finished, 646 bond issues and 270 issuers made up the sample before digging into 
the letters archived in Stamdata. 
The next step was to go through the letters sent from the trustee to the bondholders to search 
for defaults covered by the Moody’s definition. The analysis in this thesis are conducted per 
issuer. An alternative would have been to include all the issued bonds in the final sample, but 
the observations for each company now become highly dependent on each other, and the 
advantage of a larger sample was not deemed big enough to justify a per bond approach. A 
concern was that many borrowers had issued multiple bonds in the period covered, and that 
some of the defaulting firms had defaulted on several bonds. When multiple defaults are 
present, the default date is set as the default date on the first bond where default is noticed. 
The default date was set to be either the date of the letter in Stamdata for a bondholders meeting 
regarding the incident, or a letter of information providing evidence that default had occurred. 
One company, Northland Resources AB, had to be withdrawn from the sample because a letter 
from the company to the bondholders proposing a restructuring was missing in Stamdata.  
For the companies that had not defaulted on a bond issue, the first bond issued by the borrower 
is used when comparing non-defaulted firms with defaulted firms. This choice is important 
because it determines the period for which information is supposed to be collected. The rule 
has been circumvented in some cases because of little adequate financial data for some firms 
in the beginning of the period. In some cases, issues made when the company was completely 
different from what it is today, have been filtered out.  
When going through the bonds and issuers it soon became evident that some of the firms were 
linked together in group structures, or in a more complex business setting. Some issues in the 
Norwegian market are issues made by special purpose companies. Typically, a rig or a vessel 
is incorporated in a wholly owned subsidiary by the parent company. In cases like this, the 
parent company is taken to be real debtor. For some issues it is explicitly stated in the loan 
documents that a parent company is guaranteeing the issuer. After accounting for such 
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relationships, the sample was narrowed to a preliminary sample of 253 issuers. A brief 
overview of the filtering process, and a list of some firms left out because of such connections, 
can be found in the appendix of this thesis. In addition, some adjustments were made based 
on the weekly credit reports. One company, Aker Solutions was added back to the sample 
because of updated rating information. Tele 2 AB was also left out because it was rated 
Investment Grade at the issue date (DNB Markets, 2012).  
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5.2 Accounting information 
Most of the accounting information used in this thesis has been collected from the Centre for 
Applied Research at NHHs (SNF) accounting database. The SNF database covers accounting 
information from 1993 to 2011 of nearly all the companies registered in the Brønnøysund 
Business Register Centre. As described earlier, this thesis concentrates on using information 
available around the issue date to help investors with the default risk analysis. The timing of 
the information gathering is thus important for the purpose of prediction. As a base year for 
information, the accounting year prior to the issue year is chosen as the year in which balance 
sheet and income statement- information is collected. For some firms, this was not 
manageable, mainly because the issuing company was founded in the issuing year. There is 
generally evidence from the default incidents that this involves a good deal of companies that 
financed its start-up phase. Consequently, some adjustments had to be made to gather a sample 
that was large enough to perform a statistical analysis15. 
All foreign firms and a good part of the Norwegian companies lacked adequate data in the 
SNF database. Thus, financial data was collected manually for fifty-nine companies, which 
did not appear in the SNF database, or had figures that were not reliable. Accounting 
information for seven companies was extracted from the international accounting database 
Orbis. For these companies, I could not find the annual reports by searching through 
Newsweb16, or on the respective company’s website.    
It is also useful to include group figures when a group structure exist, because pure accounting 
numbers for subsidiaries or parent companies tends to be quite misleading of what is actually 
going on in the business. The group as a whole is considered the real borrower if a subsidiary 
or a parent company in the group is registered in Stamdata as the borrower. Of the manually 
collected annual reports, some were cases where only the annual report from the subsidiary or 
the parent company was available in the SNF database. 
For the manually collected annual reports, many of the firms reported their annual accounts in 
foreign currency. Year-end exchanges rates were extracted from DataStream to convert the 
                                                 
15 A list comparing the issue year and the accounting year is found in the appendix. 
16 Newsweb is a webpage operated by the Oslo Stock Exchange that archives information disclosures from listed issuers. 
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balance sheet numbers into NOK. To convert the numbers from the income statements, daily 
average exchange rates were calculated and used to convert the line items. The method used 
is similar to the current-method used in both US. GAAP17 and in IFRS to translate financial 
statements of subsidiaries reporting in another currency into the financial statements of the 
parent company (Goedhart, Koller et al., 2010). The accounting information extracted from 
Orbis was translated from USD into NOK using the same exchange rates as for the manually 
collected reports. The accounting numbers from the manually collected annual reports have 
been defined in the same way as in the latest documentation and quality check on the database 
performed by Berner, Mjøs and Olving (2013). 
Finally, it is worth noting that if more time had been available for this thesis, then perhaps a 
couple of companies could have been supplemented to the final sample, and a more detailed 
set of variables could have been collected. It is unlikely that the sample would have been any 
larger if a different base year had been chosen. The decision to use information available at 
the time of issuance was chosen for both practical reasons, and because of the low liquidity in 
many of the bond issues in Norway.  
  
                                                 
17 United States Generally Applied Accounting Principles. 
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5.3 Choice of independendt variables 
As previously mentioned, the data gathering of financial variables has been quite challenging 
because of little available and sometimes thin financial data for a large part of the preliminary 
sample. This sets a clear limitation of what variables that can be included as predictors of 
default. For each issued bond, issue specific variables are collected. This is done because an 
issue can be perceived more or less attractive depending on the contractual features of the 
bond’s indenture. This type of information was extracted from the Stamdata database.  
The variables contained in the different versions of the SEBRA-model have been used a 
starting point for finding issuer specific variables predicting default. The end of this chapter 
describes the chosen variables from the SEBRA-model in more detail. Several other possible 
explanatory variables of default were also collected. The inspiration for the other possible 
explanatory variables were taken from the previous mentioned studies on default and 
bankruptcy prediction. These variables are extracted from the balance sheet and income 
statement line items, as well as combining the issue specific variables extracted from the 
Stamdata database with accounting figures.  
Ideally, it would have been useful to extract averages and standard deviations for some of the 
variables prior to issuance, for example to measure corporate performance over time, and to 
get a sense of the fluctuations in earnings. However, this has not been possible due to many 
firms being start-ups, or firms being very different from year to year due to the presence of 
merger and acquisitions.  
Another concern that came while looking through the distribution of the variables was that 
many companies were start-ups that made their first real debt financing through the High Yield 
bond market. Thus, some of the firms had debt levels and equity ratios that were not 
representative for their ratios after the bond issue. Investors will generally only invest in the 
bonds of a company if they think that the company can handle the debt level they receive after 
the bond issue is made. To correct for this problem, the issued amount in each issue is added 
to both the debt level and the total assets of each company. This correction affects both the 
reported debt level, equity ratios, and liquidity ratios. Since the different business performance 
measures are supposed to measure the historical performance of each issuers, the original debt 
level and the original size of the company, are used when computing these ratios. I recognize 
that this correction are not a perfect substitute for the equity ratios and debt levels after the 
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bond issue. It could be that some of the firms issued a mixture of debt and equity at the same 
time to finance their investments, or that a later bond issue was already planned and marketed 
to the investors with a later issue date.  
5.3.1 Issue specific variables 
Coupon: One should expect that the more risky the issuing firm is perceived, the larger the 
coupon rate of the issue. Coupon rates will generally vary with the overall interest level 
prevailing in the financial markets. To correct for the general interest rate level at the time of 
issuance, the relevant reference rate for the currency in which the bond is denominated is 
subtracted from the observed coupon rate. The most common reference rates used in the 
Norwegian bond market is the 3-month NIBOR interest rate for issues in NOK, and the 3-
months LIBOR interest rate for issues in USD. The final sample consists of issues in NOK 
and issues in USD only18.  
Two of the bonds in the final sample were zero-coupon issues, a bond issued by Petrolia ASA, 
and a bond issued by Banetele AS. For the Banetele bond, it was impossible to calculate the 
yield to maturity of the bond because the loan documents were missing in Stamdata. The yield 
to maturity at the issue date was used as a proxy for the coupon rate in the Petrolia case. 
Convertible versus non-convertible: Convertible bonds will generally carry a coupon rate that 
is lower than a regular bond issue, if the issue is similar in all other aspects (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2011). In order to adjust for a convertible provision in the bond indenture, a dummy variable 
is generated that exhibits one if the issue has a convertible provision. Firms that find it difficult 
to raise equity at a fair price frequently use convertible bonds, typically high growth and start-
up firms. This makes it interesting to test if convertible bonds issues are more prone to default. 
However, some firms issue a mixture of convertibles and regular bonds. This could cause this 
effect to be less obvious. 
Issued amount: Grammenos, Nomikos and Papaostoulo (2008) found that the amount raised 
divided by total assets was a significant variable when predicting the probability of default for 
shipping High Yield bond issues. Although their sample was a small one, and consisted only 
of shipping companies, the variable is included as a supplement to the pure issuer specific 
                                                 
18 In the preliminary sample, one bond was issued in DKK and another bond was issued in EUR. 
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variables. One should be cautious when interpreting the results regarding this variable because 
some firms issue series of bonds at different dates, and the time-period between the issues can 
seem arbitrarily. Going through these details, and finding out the total issue volume of debt 
financing that is communicated to investors at the issue date, is an almost impossible task.  
Not Matured: In order to perform the analysis on a sample with both matured issues and issues 
that are still viable assets, a dummy variable is generated. The variable is one if the issue is 
still a viable asset as of 01.10.2013. 
Seniority and type of security for each bond are also clearly relevant when gauging the 
potential for possible losses in case of default. According to Håvik (2012), expected default 
frequency is constant across seniority and rating class. Consequently, the security and seniority 
of each bond is not included as potential determinants of financial distress. These contract 
specifications are certainly highly relevant when one is to conduct a recovery rate analysis. It 
is also rather difficult to extract these specifications from Stamdata in a consistent way without 
having to look into each loan document manually.  
5.3.2 SEBRA variables 
The starting point for choosing the issuer specific variables is the before mentioned SEBRA-
model. The SEBRA-model has performed well in predicting bankruptcy on Norwegian 
companies through several periods and applications. However, the model has not been directly 
applied to defaults. In fact, Bernhardsen, Eklund and Larsen (2001) states that they originally 
wanted to estimate the probability of a company defaulting, but due to data limitations they 
decided to estimate the probability of bankruptcy instead. As noted by Bernhardsen (2001), 
his choice of explanatory variables in the original SEBRA-model must be viewed as 
suggestions. Bernhardsen also states, that any model of default or bankruptcy-prediction 
should contain a measure of liquidity, a measure of solidity, and some measure of business 
performance. In this thesis, the predictive variables are defined as in the publication in 
Economic Bulletin 3.2007 published by the Central Bank of Norway. In this publication, the 
authors propose two versions of the SEBRA-model, SEBRA-basic and SEBRA-extended. 
Some of the variables in SEBRA-extended proved to be difficult to define in a consistent way 
from the manually collected annual reports. However, the variables of the basic version of the 
model proved to be much more accessible to foreign companies and companies reporting 
under different reporting standards. It is also worth noting that the dependent variable is 
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different in the SEBRA-model compared to how the dependent variable is defined in this 
thesis. The dependent variable in this study is simply issued in the Norwegian bond market 
and defaulted, or non-defaulted, before October 2013. A description of the SEBRA variables 
that are used follows: 
Business performance:  In the SEBRA model the variable measuring business performance is 
the ratio of ordinary profit before depreciation and write-downs divided by total debt. It is not 
totally clear what is meant by ordinary profit, and the definition of what is considered 
extraordinary items can vary between firms and reporting standards. The definition that is used 
for generating the variable is the following: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒
 
From the SNF database, the variable “aarsrs” is used as ordinary profit after tax, “anlvurd” 
is used as depreciation and amortization, and “gjeld” is used to measure total debt before the 
bond issue. 
Leverage: The measure of leverage in SEBRA-model is the book value of equity divided by 
total assets: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒
  
From the SNF database, the variable “ek” is used as the book value of equity, and the variable 
“sumeiend” is used for total assets. 
Liquidity: The chosen liquidity measure of the SEBRA- model is the following: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
  
Due to the presence of firms being in an establishment phase, a good part of the final sample 
had operating revenues equal to zero. To overcome this problem, and to avoid cutting 
observations, the variable is adjusted to the following: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒
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The adjusted variable measures in essence the same phenomenon, that a smaller cash reservoir 
of the company relative to its size will predict a greater likelihood of financial distress. From 
SNF, “cash” is used for liquid assets, “kgjeld” is used for short-term debt, and “sumeiend” is 
used for total assets. 
Lost equity: An indicator variable is included which is supposed to measure if the observed 
equity ratio is due to accumulated earnings, or if the ratio is maintained by the raising of new 
equity. This indicator variable is one if the book value of equity is less than paid in equity, and 
zero otherwise. When the book value of equity is less than paid in equity it indicates to some 
degree that the firm has not been able to accumulate profits and is badly run. From SNF, 
“inn_ek” is used as paid-in equity capital. 
Size: Previous studies have found that the probability of default and bankruptcy, are lower for 
larger companies. Hence, a measure of size is included as a possible alternative explanatory 
variable. This variable is included in the SEBRA-extended model by taking the logarithm of 
total assets: 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒) 
From the SNF database, “sumeiend” is used as a measure of total assets. 
The variables trade accounts payable as a percentage of total assets, as well as unpaid taxes 
and public dues as a percentage of total assets, that appears in SEBRA-extended had to be 
dropped because of difficulties finding the relevant items in the manually collected annual 
reports. They were present in some of the collected annual reports, but these balance sheet 
figures were often consolidated under items like other short-term debt, making it impossible 
to determine their presence and size. The relevance of these variables for large multinational 
corporations is also up for discussion. Bernhardsen (2001) states that the main reason for 
including public dues and unpaid taxes is that bankruptcy proceedings are often initiated by 
the revenue authorities, and that the  level of trade credit varies a lot between industries. 
Industry variables: In the SEBRA-model, yearly industry effects is captured by the industry 
mean of the book equity ratio, as well as the industry mean and the standard deviation of the 
business performance measure. These ratios are calculated from the yearly-consolidated 
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annual report dataset found in the SNF database. The 2-digit industry NACE19 code version 
published in 2007 is used for grouping the observations by industry. Foreign companies, and 
some of the Norwegian companies, did not have NACE codes registered. These companies 
are compared with a comparable firm when defining the missing codes. Thus, all the firms in 
the sample are classified by the 2-digit NACE code.  
5.3.3 Other possible explanatory variables 
Tangibility: One should suppose that the greater the value of tangible assets compared to the 
total assets of the company, the greater is the capacity for generating cash flow from operations 
and thus for the company to avoid financial distress. However, Huffman and Ward (1996) 
found that the larger the value of collateralized assets to the book value of assets, the greater 
is the probability of default. The opposite can also be true, in that market participants generally 
speak of companies that have a larger share of standardized assets with proven technology to 
be safer bets than companies that is more dependent on intangible assets for generating their 
stream of revenue (Håvik, 2012). The ratio is also highly relevant when the bond investor 
assess the expected recovery rate of an issue. The ratio used is the following: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
From SNF, the variable, “vardrmdl” is used to measure property, plant and equipment. An 
alternative to this measure is to calculate the share of intangible assets to total assets. Note that 
the issued amount is not added to the total assets of the issuer. 
Alternative measure of performance: EBITDA divided by total assets is included as an 
alternative measure of corporate performance. This is done for two reasons, the first being that 
the measure of performance in the SEBRA-model can be highly inflated if the debt level prior 
to the first bond issuance is low compared to EBITDA, and second because EBITDA is a 
measure that is more suitable when comparing companies with different capital structures. 
EBITDA serves as a proxy for the operating cash flow generated by a company. The ratio is 
calculated as follows: 
                                                 
19 The NACE standard is the standard used by the EU to classify companies into industries. 
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𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
=
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
For ordinary profit, “driftrs” is used. “anlvurd” is the variable used for deprecations, 
amortizations, and write-downs. 
Interest coverage: An interest coverage measure is included. This measure can be defined in 
several ways. One possible financial indicator is EBITDA divided by interest expenses, but 
for this particular sample, there is a problem with generating missing values if the variable is 
constructed in the usual way. This is because many of the firms reported their interest rate cost 
to be zero in the last available financial statement before the issue date. The inverse of the 
interest coverage ratio is applied instead. It captures the same information, but one must 
interpret the outcome of the analysis in a different way: 
1
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒
=
1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
=
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
  
A concern is that many of the start-up companies had debt levels and subsequently interest 
expenses that were not representative of the interest expense going forward because the bond 
issue was the first major debt financing arrangement of the company. The variable is therefore 
calculated by adding a computed interest payment, after the bond issue to the interest expense 
from the annual reports. This is done by multiplying the coupon of the issue by the issued 
amount. 
From SNF “rentekost” is used for interest expense, and EBITDA is applied as before. 
Other accounting ratios: In addition, three accounting ratios are collected with inspiration 
from Altman (1968). Current assets divided by current liabilities (commonly known as the 
current ratio), working capital to total assets, and EBIT divided by total assets.  
Start-up: One should suspect that start-up companies would exhibit a greater probability of 
default on their debt. Older companies are typically larger, use more recognized and well-
known technology, have more experience with internal control, and the managers are usually 
more experienced. It could be that a merger or an acquisition dampens these effects for some 
companies. Nevertheless, it is likely that the risk of default is greater for start-up companies 
than for companies with a longer operating history. The variable is constructed by subtracting 
the establishment year from the accounting year, and grouping companies with an age lower 
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or equal to four years in a start-up phase category. This dummy variable exhibits zero if the 
company is older than four years, and one otherwise. Similarly, SEBRA-extended use 
indicator variables for up to eight years since establishment. The SEBRA specification is not 
used because of the problem with applying too many covariates relative to the sample size. 
Crisis: Many defaults occurred in the years 2008 and 2009 after the record issue year of 2007. 
The main reason for this wave of defaults was the financial crisis, which caused cyclical high-
leveraged companies to fall into financial distress. Since defaults also have been found to be 
highly correlated with economic growth, a dummy variable is generated that is one if the bond 
is issued in 2006 or 2007, and zero otherwise. The reason for imposing a variable like the crisis 
dummy variable is to test if the issues made in the years preceding the crisis were issues that 
exhibited a greater likelihood of defaulting. If this variable turns out to be positive and 
significant, then maybe investors misgauged the credit risk in many of the issues in the high 
volume issue years preceding the crisis. A different method of correcting for macroeconomic 
factors would have been a yearly dummy variable, but in the final sample, there is a problem 
of applying such a specification because of the small sample size. 
Market value of equity for publicly traded firms: 89 of the companies that makes up the final 
sample had publicly traded equity around the time of their respective bond issues. However, 
it is not a good idea to mix book values of equity with market values of equity when analysing 
default risk. As an example, Altman (2002) prefers estimating the Z-score with two different 
models, with the book value of equity for private firms, and using the market value of equity 
for publicly traded firms. Although two distinct samples are not possible because of the already 
small sample size, a measure of market-based equity-ratio is used to collect a subsample of 
companies that had available data for the market value of equity at the end of the accounting 
year prior to issuance. These market values are the reported values of “Market Value of 
Capital” (MVC) or “Market Value” (MV) from the last trading day observed in the accounting 
year. The information is extracted from DataStream.  
As explored in the Merton and KMV-model, market based leverage compared to the asset 
volatility of the firm gives us a market based assessment of the likelihood of default. Asset 
volatility can be estimated from the company’s equity volatility and the company’s debt to 
value ratio. To estimate equity volatility with reasonable accuracy, one need at least a couple 
of years of equity prices. Because of some firms that went public the year before issuance, and 
because of an already low sample size, the asset volatility and the corresponding distance to 
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default is not brought in as a possible covariate. The book value of debt is used as a proxy for 
the market value of debt. The market based leverage measure is calculated as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + (𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒)
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5.4 Sample overview 
5.4.1 Preliminary sample of bond issues 
Figure 7 gives an overview of what type of bonds that are included in the preliminary sample, 
along with the issue year of the bonds. Most of the issuers in the sample issued bonds after 
2003, and there is not much data on bonds issued in previous years in Stamdata. Most of the 
bonds are bonds without a convertible provision. This does not mean that the contractual 
features of the regular bonds are simple. Many bonds are callable, and include a variety of 
covenants that sets limits on financial ratios, and/or possible actions taken by the borrower. 
These details are not explicitly listed in the Stamdata database, so one need to go through each 
loan document to gather such information. Since the scope of this thesis is to examine the 
default risk of the borrowers, I chose not to dig into these details. A total of 253 issuers and 
621 bonds make up the preliminary sample. 500 of the bonds are regular bonds without a 
convertible provision, and 121 of the bonds are convertible issues. 
Figure 7 Issue year and issue types-preliminary sample 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the observed defaults by year and a split up by the type of default 
covered by the Moody’s definition. Credit events covered by the Moody’s definition were 
found for 160 bonds in the preliminary sample. 
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Table 2 Defaults by year and category preliminary sample by  bonds 
Type of default 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Moody's category 1)  1 9 16 5 7 6 2 46 
Moody's category 2)   6 7 1    14 
Moody's category 3) 1 3 13 52 12 9 5 5 100 
Sum 1 4 28 75 18 16 11 7 160 
Percentage 0,6 % 2,5 % 17,5 % 46,9 % 11,3 % 10,0 % 6,9 % 4,4 % 100,0 % 
Average days to default         685 
 
We can see that the majority of the defaults in the Norwegian High Yield bond market have 
been a Moody’s category 3) default. This category is rather broad, and exhibits both complex 
restructurings, and other simple amendments to the bond contract, like postponement of the 
maturity date. Some judgement was involved in classifying the observed defaults in one of the 
category. In cases were the category was not very clear, the category judged to be the best 
description of the incident was chosen. Generally, if there exists a restructuring proposal, 
which both consists of a delayed payment and a proposal of exchange of debt into equity, the 
credit event was classified as being in the distressed exchange category. It is worth noting that 
some of the firms that had credit events categorized in category 1) and 3), also filed for 
bankruptcy at a later stage. Only fourteen of the observed defaults were incidents where a 
bankruptcy filing was the first possible information about the default. Finally, it is worth 
noting that 86 issuers compromise the 160 different bonds that is found to be involved in a 
default.  
We see that most of the defaults occurred when the financial crisis was at its worst in 2008 
and 2009, especially the year of 2009, which accounts for nearly half of the defaults found. 
Much of the outstanding volume of High Yield bonds that were issued in the big issue years 
of 2006 and 2007 went into trouble because of the financial crisis. The average time from 
issuance to default is 650 days, or slightly under two years from the issue date. This result 
must be seen in conjunction with the large volume in 2006 and 2007. If another period had 
been covered, it is likely that the average time to default would have been lower. 
We can also see which industries that make up the preliminary sample based on the industry 
classification in Stamdata. The industries Oil and Gas, Service, Shipping, and the broad 
Industry classification, are the industries that have experienced most of the defaults. In 
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addition, these industries dominate the issuer landscape in the Norwegian corporate bond 
market and the business landscape in Norway in general. An industry overview per issue is 
provided in table 3. 
Table 3 Industry overview preliminary sample by issues 
Industry 
Number of 
issues 
Percentage of 
total 
Defaulted 
issues 
Percentage of issues 
defaulted 
Oil and Gas 219 35,3 % 62 28,3 % 
Shipping 142 22,9 % 16 11,3 % 
Industry 94 15,1 % 23 24,5 % 
Service 59 9,5 % 32 54,2 % 
Property 25 4,0 % 7 28,0 % 
Telecom/IT 23 3,7 % 9 39,1 % 
Fishery 22 3,5 % 8 36,4 % 
Transportation 12 1,9 % 1 8,3 % 
Pulp and Paper 10 1,6 % 1 10,0 % 
Media 6 1,0 % 0 0,0 % 
Wholesale and 
Retail 5 0,8 % 1 20,0 % 
Food and 
Beverages 4 0,6 % 0 0,0 % 
Total 621 100,0 % 160 25,8 % 
 
The oil and gas industry, and the shipping industry, dominate the total number of issues in the 
final sample with a percentage share of around 35% and 23%. As previously mentioned, these 
industries dominate the issuer landscape in the Norwegian bond market, and are thought of as 
being capital heavy industries. Shipping bonds appears to be relatively safe compared to the 
other industries if we look at the percentage number of bonds defaulting. 11,3% of the bonds 
issued by shipping companies in the preliminary sample have experienced a default. This is 
significantly lower than the percentage of defaults experienced by other large groups of 
companies like the oil and gas sector, the service sector, and the industry sector. The service 
industry has the highest default rate by number of issues. Companies that are classified in this 
industry are mostly oil-service companies. About a quarter of the issues that is included in the 
final sample have been involved in a default, this high default rate is not surprising given that 
the final sample covers firms assumed to be High Yield issuers. 
Table 4 provides the same sort of industry classification broken down by issued amount and 
the percentage of issued amount defaulting. The average size per issue is also shown. 
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Table 4 Industry overview preliminary sample by issued amount 
Industry 
Issued amount 
MNOK 
Defaulted 
amount MNOK 
Percentage of amount 
defaulted 
Average size 
per issue 
Oil and Gas 151171 30893 20,4 % 690 
Shipping 65535 4783 7,3 % 462 
Industry 43898 9387 21,4 % 467 
Service 21390 12024 56,2 % 363 
Property 8337 826 9,9 % 333 
Pulp and 
Paper 7980 385 4,8 % 798 
Fishery 7960 2545 32,0 % 362 
Transportatio
n 6549 150 2,3 % 546 
Telecom/IT 1981 517 26,1 % 86 
Media 1900 0 0,0 % 317 
Food and 
Beverages 1450 0 0,0 % 363 
Wholesale and 
Retail 640 40 6,3 % 128 
Total 318790 61550 19,3 % 513,35 
 
The service industry also has the highest percentage defaulted amount if the default rate is 
measured in terms of issued amount. The average issued amount per bond in the final sample 
is about 500 million. We also see that the average issued amount of the oil and gas industry 
comes in second. Only pulp and paper has a higher average issued amount per bond, but this 
calculation is based on only ten issues. About one-fifth of the issued volume in the final sample 
have experienced a default by October 2013. The measure of defaulted amount do not coincide 
with the actual losses to investors, because one need to factor in the recovered amount in each 
of the observed default. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to calculate recovery rates for the 
defaulted bonds. 
Nearly all of the bonds in the preliminary sample were fixed coupon issues (306 bonds), or 
floating rate notes (299) bonds.  Thirteen of the issues were zero coupon issues and one bond 
was a step up interest issue. 466 of the bonds were registered in Stamdata as issued by 
companies domiciled in Norway (75%).  
5.4.2 Final sample of issuers 
After coupling the information from Stamdata with accounting information, the final sample 
shrank to 176 issuers and 176 bond issues, according to the process described earlier in this 
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chapter. A list of the firms excluded due to unavailable financial data can be found in the 
appendix of the thesis. The final sample includes 59 firms that experienced a default during 
the period covered. Although it was not possible to gather financial information from around 
the issue date for 77 companies, the final sample is still quite representative for the issuers, 
and the issue characteristics in the Norwegian High Yield bond market. The final sample 
includes companies within all the industries observed in the preliminary sample. The 
distribution of bonds and issue years present in the final sample are given in figure 8.  
Figure 8 Issue year and issue types-final sample 
 
Of the 176 issues, 144 bonds were regular bond issues without a convertible provision, and 32 
bonds were convertibles. We see that the final sample provides fairly the same distribution of 
issue years and bond types compared to the preliminary sample. 
Table 5 gives an overview of defaults by year, and a split up by the type of default given by 
the Moody’s definition, observed in the final sample. 
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Table 5 Defaults by year and category-final sample 
Type of default 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Moody's category 1)  1 1 7 1 3 2 1 16 
Moody's category 2)   2 2     4 
Moody's category 3) 1 2 7 19 4 2 2 2 39 
Sum 1 3 10 28 5 5 4 3 59 
Percentage 1,7 % 5,1 % 16,9 % 47,5 % 8,5 % 8,5 % 6,8 % 5,1 % 100,0 % 
Average days to default         773 
 
The industry distribution is pretty much the same in the final sample as in the preliminary 
sample. Table 6 reports various issuers and defaulted issuers by industry. 
Table 6 Industry overview-final sample 
Industry 
Number of 
issuers 
Percentage of 
total 
Defaulted 
issuers 
Percentage of issuers 
defaulted 
Oil and Gas 50 28,4 % 17 34,0 % 
Shipping 39 22,2 % 8 20,5 % 
Industry 29 16,5 % 10 34,5 % 
Service 16 9,1 % 11 68,8 % 
Telecom/IT 13 7,4 % 5 38,5 % 
Property 10 5,7 % 2 20,0 % 
Fishery 8 4,5 % 4 50,0 % 
Transportation 4 2,3 % 0 0,0 % 
Food and 
Beverages 3 1,7 % 0 0,0 % 
Pulp and Paper 2 1,1 % 1 50,0 % 
Media 1 0,6 % 0 0,0 % 
Wholesale and 
Retail 1 0,6 % 1 100,0 % 
Total 176 100,0 % 59 33,5 % 
 
All the industries that were present in the preliminary sample are still present in the final 
sample. Twenty-seven defaulting firms were lost during the financial gathering process, and 
fifty non-defaulting firms had to be omitted from the final sample due to unavailable financial 
data. About one-third of the issuers in the final sample experienced a default during the period 
covered. 
132 (75%) of the issuers were reported to have their domicile in Norway, while the rest of the 
firms were reported to be domiciled in foreign countries like Bermuda (14 issuers) and Sweden 
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(6 issuers). The rest of the issuers were spread in small numbers across different countries. It 
should be noted that it was generally more difficult to gather financial information for the 
foreign issuers This causes a slightly biased sample towards Norwegian issuers, but the final 
sample has a share of issuers that is representative with the observed share of foreign versus 
Norwegian companies found in the preliminary sample. We can see that although many cases 
were lost due to insufficient data, much of the variation in the preliminary sample is captured 
by the final sample. A list of all the issuers that are included in the final sample can be found 
in the appendix. 
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5.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics for the collected SEBRA variables. Skewness and Kurtosis 
are reported to gauge the normality of the ratio distributions. A positive skewness indicates 
that the distribution is skewed to the right, while a negative skewness indicates that the 
distribution is skewed to the left. On the other hand, kurtosis measures the degree of fat tails 
in the distribution. The value of the skewness measure is zero if the variable is drawn from the 
normal distribution. Similarly, kurtosis should come out with a value of three if the variable is 
drawn from a normal distribution (Bodie, Kane et al., 2011). 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics SEBRA variables 
Variable N Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Performance 176 -0,42 0,04 5,79 -71,06 5,40 -12,86 168,94 
Liquidity 176 -0,05 -0,04 0,43 -0,52 0,18 -0,11 3,12 
Equity Ratio 176 0,32 0,31 0,88 -0,17 0,18 0,18 3,17 
Size of Company 176 14,52 14,52 18,03 10,39 1,55 0,01 2,62 
 
The variable measuring business performance includes some heavy outliers, especially at the 
left tail of the distribution, and the distribution is skewed to the left. Many of the firms that 
exhibits extreme values on this variable are categorized as start-up companies that, as 
expected, experienced operating losses in their first years. For the rest of the variables, 
assuming normality seem reasonable. 
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics for each of the proposed alternative variables: 
 
Table 8 Descriptive statistics Alternative variables 
Variable N Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Share of Tangible Assets 176 0,47 0,51 0,97 0,00 0,32 -0,14 1,54 
EBITDA/Total Assets 176 0,01 0,03 0,46 -1,36 0,20 -3,16 19,81 
Interest Coverage Ratio 176 -0,64 0,17 21,64 -46,24 5,48 -4,18 34,47 
Coupon 175 0,05 0,05 0,15 -0,04 0,03 0,27 3,49 
Issued amount/ Total Assets 176 0,81 0,21 38,39 0,00 3,35 9,37 98,25 
Working Capital Ratio 176 0,07 0,07 0,58 -0,45 0,15 0,05 4,16 
EBIT/Total Assets 176 -0,03 0,01 0,29 -1,43 0,20 -3,57 21,28 
Current Ratio 176 4,30 1,47 148,92 0,07 13,08 8,48 88,39 
Market Leverage Ratio 89 0,47 0,49 0,91 0,02 0,20 -0,13 2,62 
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Six variables stands out from the kurtosis and skewness measure as being clearly non-normally 
distributed; the SEBRA performance ratio, EBITDA divided by total assets, the interest 
coverage ratio, issued amount divided by total assets, EBIT divided by total assets, and the 
current ratio. A graphical distribution for EBITDA/Total Assets is provided in figure 9 as an 
example of the distribution of one of the collected variables. 
Figure 9 Histogram EBITDA/Total Assets 
 
The distribution is skewed to the left, and we find some extreme values at the left of the 
distribution. The normal curve is drawn to compare the distribution with the distribution that 
appears if we assume normality. The presence of outliers could constitute a problem when 
performing regression analysis, and when performing other statistical analysis. Assuming 
normality, or not, also serves as a guideline for choosing the right statistical tool. 
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Frequencies for each of the indicator variables are provided in table 9. 
Table 9 Frequency table indicator variables 
Lost Equity Frequency Percent Not Matured Frequency Percent 
0 111 63,07 0 115 65,34 
1 65 36,93 1 61 34,66 
Total 176 100 Total 176 100 
Start-up     Convertible Bond     
0 103 58,52 0 144 81,82 
1 73 41,48 1 32 18,18 
Total 176 100 Total 176 100 
Crisis        
0 103 58,52    
1 73 41,48    
Total 176 100    
 
Sligthly over 40% of the sample is made up by companies that were founded less than five 
years from the accounting year20. The presence of many start-up companies, together with 
the relative high amount of issues coming up to the financial crisis, make the sample 
particulur risky in terms of default risk. It is also worth noting that 65% off the issues have 
either matured, have been called, or the issuer has filed for bankruptcy.  
                                                 
20 Or less than six years from the issue year. 
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6. Methodology 
In this chapter, the statistical tools were are used to analyse the sample of defaulting, and non-
defaulting companies, from the Norwegian corporate bond market are introduced.  
6.1 Wilcoxons rank-sum test 
One possible way to compare the difference between variables of different groups is to 
perform the student t-test, which tests if there is statistically significant difference between the 
means of two groups. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the sample is clearly not normally 
distributed among some of the variables. One test that is more robust to outliers, and still can 
be used to compare the values of variables between two populations, is the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (Keller, 2012). The test technically ranks the observation of the two groups that we 
wish to compare from the smallest observed value to the largest observed value. It then sums 
the rank number of these two groups two form a test statistic that is set arbitrarily to be the 
rank sum of one of the groups. The following hypothesis can then be tested: 
𝐻0: The location of the two populations is the same 
𝐻1: The location of one population is different from the location of the other population. 
For a sample size larger than ten observations, the test statistic is approximately normally 
distributed with a mean of 𝐸(𝑇) and a standard deviation of 𝜎𝑇: 
𝐸(𝑇) =
𝑛1(𝑛2+𝑛2+1)
2
  And 𝜎𝑇 = √
𝑛1𝑛2(𝑛1+𝑛2+1)
12
 
𝐸(𝑇) is the expected value of the test-statistic (𝑇), 𝑛1 is the number of observations in group 
one, and 𝑛2 is the number of observations in group two.  
The standardized test statistic becomes: 
𝑧 =
𝑇 −  𝐸(𝑇)
𝜎𝑇
 
The Rank-sum test is used in the analysis section as a tool when comparing the medians of the 
chosen independent variables between the defaulting and non-defaulting issuers. 
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6.2 Regression analysis 
6.2.1 The Linear Probability Model 
Default is a binary dependent variable, thus we cannot use ordinary multiple regression 
analysis when predicting default. One way to deal with a binary dependent variable is to use 
the linear Probability model (LPM). If the zero conditional mean assumption holds21, then it 
is true that: 
𝐸(𝑦|𝒙) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 
Where 𝒙 is a vector of covariates, 𝛽𝑘 are the coefficients of each of the independent variables. 
If the dependent variable is binary, that is taking on the values zero or one, it is always true 
that: 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) = 𝐸(𝑦|𝒙) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 
Which says that the probability of the dependent variable taking on the value one is linear in 
the set of explanatory independent variables. The most important drawbacks with a model like 
this is that the predicted probabilities can come out with a value greater than one, and that the 
effect of a change in the predicted probability of similar changes in the explanatory variables 
are constant no matter what the initial value of the other independent variables (Wooldridge, 
2009). This is particular a problem in the collected final sample because of the presence of 
outliers. The predicted probabilities from the analysis are very likely to be above one, or 
negative for some of the companies, and the corresponding predictions become meaningless.  
  
                                                 
21 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘 = 0) In words: The expected value of the residual is zero regardless of the value of the predictors. 
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6.2.2 The Logit Model 
One way to avoid some of the LPM limitations is to define a function who assures that the 
predicted probabilities takes on values between zero and one. In general: 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝒙𝜷) 
Where 𝒙𝜷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 
There are two specific forms of the function 𝐺 that have dominated the applications when 
researchers needs to deal with a dichotomous variable; the Logit model, and the Probit model. 
The Probit model is not discussed further, but the analysis of the Probit model is quite similar 
compared to the Logit model. The primary difference is that the function G is the cumulative 
normal function in the Probit model, while the function G in the Logit model is the logistic 
function: 
𝐺(𝑧) =
𝑒𝑧
1 + 𝑒𝑧
=
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑧
 
Where z is any real number. One can see from this function that whatever the value of z, the 
function 𝐺(𝑧) returns a value between zero and one (Wooldridge, 2009). The above equation 
returns a value between zero and one because, the limit of the function 𝐺(𝑧) as z approaches 
infinity is one, and the limit of the function 𝐺(𝑧) as z approaches negative infinity is zero.  
The logistic model estimated is: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒙) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1𝑖+⋯𝛽𝑥𝑘𝑖+𝑢𝑖)
 
Where 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒙) is the probability that observation 𝑦𝑖, given the vector of independent 
variables, will take on the value of one. 
Since a model like this is nonlinear, the coefficients cannot be estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Instead, the model is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
The basic principle of maximum likelihood estimation is that the parameters of the model are 
chosen to maximize a function called the log-likelihood function. The log-likelihood function 
in the Logit model can be set up as the following function (Brooks, 2008): 
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𝐿𝐿𝐹 = − ∑[𝑦 𝑖 ln(1 + 𝑒
−𝑧𝑖) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖)ln (1 + 𝑒
𝑧𝑖)]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Maximizing this equation with respect to the parameters in 𝑧𝑖 can be done by taking the 
derivative of LLF with respect to the parameters, and using an iterative process of solving the 
corresponding equations (Bernhardsen, 2001). In the statistics software program STATA, one 
can see how the log-likelihood drops at each iteration.  
6.2.3 Interpretation of the Logit model 
Interpreting the coefficients: Since the logistic function is a non-linear function one must rely 
on calculus to find the partial effect of a change in one of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. However, the direction of the effect is possible to interpret directly. A 
positive coefficient would imply that a change in the variable would result in a higher 
probability of 𝑦𝑖 = 1, and a negative coefficient would imply a lower probability of 𝑦𝑖 = 0 
(Wooldridge, 2009) 
Percent correctly predicted: This is a goodness-of-fit measure where we define the predicted 
value of 𝑦𝑖 to be one if the predicted probability is greater than some defined cut-off value, 
and zero if the predicted probability is less than the cut-off value. Given a set of observation, 
we can see how well the model predicts the observations to be in the right category. This type 
of goodness of fit measure can be quite misleading, especially if the model performs poorly in 
predicting one of the outcomes. Suppose for example that we have a sample of 200 
observations with 160 𝑦𝑖 = 0, and 40 𝑦𝑖 = 1. If we predict 140 of the 160 𝑦𝑖 = 0 to be zero 
(87.5 % correct prediction), we will still get an overall accuracy rate of 70% even if none of 
the predictions of 𝑦𝑖 = 1 is correct. It is therefore recommended to gauge the predictive 
capacity of the model with respect to both categories of observed outcomes. 
Pseudo R-squared: Pseudo 𝑅2 is a goodness of fit measure, based on the log-likelihood 
function. If 𝐿0is the log-likelihood function in a model with only the intercept, and 𝐿1 is the 
log-likelihood function for our estimated model, a Pseudo R-squared goodness of fit measure 
can be calculated as: 
Pseudo 𝑅2 = 1 − (
ln 𝐿1
ln 𝐿0
) 
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This measure can only take on values between zero and one. The measure has no direct 
interpretation as the regular 𝑅2 for ordinary least squares. Pseudo R-squared can be used to 
measure if the model’s fit is improved by substituting a model by another, holding the sample 
constant (Tufte, 2000). 
Likelihood ratio-test: The likelihood-ratio test can be used to test if there is a significant 
change in the model when adding a new independent variable. It is based on the log-likelihood 
function. Suppose that we call a the log-likelihood of a model with only the intercept 𝐿0, and 
that we name the log-likelihood of a model including one explanatory variable as 𝐿1.We can 
then perform a test which tests the following null-hypothesis (𝐻0), against the alternative 
hypothesis (𝐻𝐴): 
𝐻0: 𝐿0 = 𝐿1  𝐻𝐴: 𝐿0 ≠ 𝐿1 
In words, the log-likelihoods of the two models are the same, or the log-likelihoods of the two 
models are different from each other. The test statistic is obtained by multiplying the difference 
in log-likelihoods between the two models by−2: 
𝐺2 = −2(𝐿0 − 𝐿1) 
Which is approximately chi-squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the 
difference in variables between the two models. It is important that two samples are identical. 
Hence, one must be careful with missing values when calculating this statistics between 
different sets of independent variables  
Statistical inference: The standard errors provided by maximum likelihood estimation are 
asymptotic standard errors for which the formula is quite complicated. However, once the 
standard errors of the estimators are obtained, one can construct z-tests as with ordinary least 
squares. The test statistic is: 
𝑧 =
𝛽?̂?
𝐴𝑆𝐸(𝛽?̂?)
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The null hypothesis  𝐻0: 𝛽𝑗 = 0 , and the corresponding alternative hypothesis 𝐻𝑎: 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 022, 
is kept or rejected, based on the chosen level of significance. With five percent significance 
level, the critical value becomes 1,96. With a chosen significance level of ten percent, the 
critical value becomes 1,64. 
ROC analysis: An alternative measure of the predictive power of a model is the area under the 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC-curve graphs the sensitivity versus 
the 1-specificity of a diagnostic test, based on different cut-off values. Sensitivity is the 
fraction of the positive outcomes that are identified by the diagnosis test, while specificity is 
the fraction of negative cases that are correctly classified by the diagnosis test. The closer the 
area under the ROC-curve comes to one, the greater is the predictive capacity of the model. 
                                                 
22 In a two-sided test. 
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7. Findings 
7.1 Univariate analysis 
In this section, the suggested explanatory variables are compared between the groups of 
defaulted and non-defaulted firms. This is done with the help of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
The rank-sum test actually tests if a variable drawn from two independent samples comes from 
a population with the same distribution, but in the following, the results are presented by 
speaking of median values as the central tendency measure of the two groups. Because of the 
relatively small population, and correspondingly small sample size, a significance level of ten 
percent is chosen when performing the analysis. The median and mean values of the SEBRA 
variables and the Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are reported in table 10. The 
difference calculated is the difference between the median value of the non-defaulted group, 
and the median value of the defaulted group. A positive number, and a positive Z-value, 
correspond to a median value of non-defaulted group that is higher than the median value of 
the defaulted group. 
Table 10 Rank-sum test SEBRA variables 
Variable Performance Liquidity Equity Ratio Size of Company 
Non-defaulted Median 0,09 -0,06 0,30 14,98 
N Mean 0,13 -0,08 0,30 14,95 
59           
Defaulted Median -0,04 0,02 0,35 13,51 
N Mean -1,49 0,01 0,35 13,66 
117           
Total Difference 0,13 -0,08 -0,05 1,47 
N Z-Value 5,80 -3,36 -1,832 5,373 
176 P-value 0,0000 0,0008 0,0670 0,0000 
 
All the differences in medians of the SEBRA-basic variables are significant at the ten percent 
level. The difference in median values of the size and the performance measure is what you 
would expect from earlier studies and common economic reasoning. Larger companies are 
often more diversified in terms of economic exposure, use more recognized technology, and 
have more experienced managers than smaller companies. This could be plausible 
explanations of why the median value of the size measure is lower in the group of defaulted 
firms. Firms that do not generate earnings relative to their debt are clearly in danger of falling 
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into financial distress. The median value of the SEBRA performance measure is around 9% in 
the non-defaulting category, compared to around -4% in the defaulting category. 
Consequently, the typical defaulted firm performed significantly lower already before the 
bond issue. 
The results from the median comparisons regarding liquidity and solvency are harder to 
interpret in a logical way. The median value of the liquidity measure is actually higher for the 
defaulted firms than for the non-defaulted firms. One cannot think of any valid economical 
explanation of why this result is observed. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the 
financial data is collected at the time of issuance. One should suppose that firms with a 
liquidity problem at the time of issue find it hard to issue bonds. The median equity ratio is 
also higher for the defaulting firms than for the non-defaulting firms. Although firms with less 
leverage are generally thought of as being more financially robust, a possible explanation for 
this result could be the relatively high amount of start-up firms defaulting. The equity ratio is 
higher both when the bond issue is added to total assets from the annual report, and when the 
bond issue is omitted. Table 11 shows a crosstable between the defaulted category and the 
start-up category. 
Table 11 Crosstable Start-up and Default 
Start-up Non-default Default Total 
No 79 24 103 
Percentage 67,52 40,68 58,52 
        
Yes 38 35 73 
Percentage 32,48 59,32 41,48 
Total 117 59 176 
 
Thirty-five, or about 60%, of the companies with observed defaults are classified as being in 
the start-up category. Start-up firms are typically financed mostly by equity and with little use 
of debt. Hence, these firms have higher equity ratios before they go to the debt market for 
capital. The issuance of High Yield bonds is one way for these firms to grow and develop their 
business. Although the debt level from the relevant issue is included in the debt base of these 
ratio calculations, the ratios do not take into account any additional financing that the firm 
may acquire from banks etc. This is a reason why one should interpret these results with care.   
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What about the proposed alternative predictors of failure? Table 12 reports the Z-score from 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, together with the median and mean values of the first four 
suggested alternative explanatory variables.  
Table 12 Rank-sum test alternative variables 1 
Variable 
Share of Tangible 
Assets 
EBITDA/Total 
Assets 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio Coupon 
Non-
defaulted Median 0,55 0,07 0,20 0,04 
N Mean 0,50 0,06 -0,30 0,05 
59           
Defaulted Median 0,37 -0,02 -0,39 0,05 
N Mean 0,42 -0,08 -1,32 0,06 
117           
Total Difference 0,18 0,09 0,59 -0,01 
N Z-Value 1,56 5,85 3,34 -2,34 
176 P-value 0,1182 0,0000 0,0008 0,0193 
 
The difference between the two groups is not statistically significant when it comes to the 
median value of the share of tangible assets. Thus, we cannot say from a univariate perspective 
that the non-defaulted companies had a higher share of tangible assets in their balance sheets 
compared to the defaulted group. 
The median value of the coupon measure is statistically significant, and the difference is about 
one percent. That is, the defaulted firms had a median coupon rate, adjusted for interbank 
interest rates, which was one percent above the median value of the coupon rate observed for 
the non-defaulted firms. One interpretation of this result is that the investors and the managers 
of the bond issues are, in some degree, able to filter out which issue that require a high coupon 
as compensation for default risk. One should remember that this is a purely univariate exercise, 
and that it may be necessary to correct for contractual features, for example if the particular 
bond indenture includes a convertible provision. 
The difference in median values of EBITDA divided by total assets is about nine percent, and 
the difference in population locations given by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is significant. 
Given the former discussion that many of the companies that defaults are start-up companies, 
this should come be no surprise. Typically, these companies goes through an establishment 
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phase with low or negative EBITDAs for a couple of years before generating positive cash 
flows from operations. 
The median value of the interest coverage measure is higher for the non-defaulted issuers. This 
result should again be seen as indicating that the defaulted firms are typically start-ups with 
low debt levels, and correspondingly low interest payments levels before their first bond 
issue23. This result is the same, regardless of adding the computed interest cost of the issue to 
the interest expense taken from the annual reports or not. 
Table 13 shows the performed Rank-sum test of the remaining proposed alternative variables. 
Table 13 Rank-sum test alternative variables 2 
Variable 
Issued 
amount/Total 
Assets 
Working 
Capital Ratio 
EBIT/Total 
Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Market 
Leverage 
Non-
defaulted 
Media
n 0,14 0,04 0,04 1,29 0,46 
N Mean 0,66 0,05 0,02 2,19 0,45 
59             
Defaulte
d 
Media
n 0,36 0,12 -0,03 1,98 0,53 
N Mean 1,10 0,10 -0,11 8,47 0,53 
117             
Total 
Differe
nce -0,22 -0,07 0,07 -0,68 -0,07 
N 
Z-
Value -5,36 -2,00 5,63 -3,02 -1,65 
176 
P-
value 0,0000 0,0461 0,0000 0,0025 0,0985 
 
One of the more interest findings is that the defaulted firms have a median value of issue size 
to total assets that is around 22 % higher compared to the non-defaulted firms. This indicates 
that one should be careful with companies that issue bonds with an issue volume that is large 
compared to their current balance sheets. However, how large is a difficult question to answer. 
Certainly, there is a need evaluate each issue case by case regarding if the company is able to 
handle the proposed debt volume. 
                                                 
23 Remember that the inverse of the traditional interest coverage ratio is calculated. 
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The EBIT to total asset ratio measures in essence the same thing as the EBITDA to total asset 
ratio, but also included the company’s ability to generate earnings and cash flows when an 
amount equal to the accounting year depreciation and amortization is reinvested in the 
business. The sign of the difference between the two groups is positive, and this result is in 
line with what you would expect from traditional studies of credit risk. 
Again, the working capital to total assets and the current ratio, has the opposite sign of what 
you would expect from a traditional analysis. Again, the likely explanation is that the 
accounting information of the newly started firms are not especially relevant going forward, 
and that the asset and liability structure is changed as the firms become older. 
To bring a market value dimension to the analysis, the market-based leverage is compared 
between the two groups for a subsample of 89 companies that were public at the time of 
issuance, and where the market value of equity was possible to extract form DataStream. The 
result is now the opposite of what was found when comparing the book equity ratio between 
the two groups. The defaulted firms have a median market based leverage ratio of about 53%, 
compared to 46% for the non-defaulted firms. A possible explanation for this result is that the 
issuers that were public at the time of issuance are older companies that have a more normal 
debt level. Opposed to the firms that did not have publicly traded equity, which used mostly 
private equity financing before searching for financing in the public capital market. 
It is also of interest to see if the issuers of the different categories of default identified by the 
Moody’s definition differed around the issue date on several of the proposed explanatory 
variables. However, due to the now small sample size with few observations in each category, 
a statistical exercise is almost impossible to carry out in a proper way. Few of the differences 
in values of the variables are likely to be statistically significant. 
From the univariate analysis, we can summarize that one can question the predictive power of 
the book equity ratio and the liquidity ratio from the SEBRA-model as possible predictors of 
default in the Norwegian High Yield corporate bond market, when using information available 
at the time of issuance. If these variables are used, one should be cautious with interpreting 
the variables as in a traditional credit risk model. The reason for some of the more strange 
results could be the relative high number of defaults by firms classified as newly started 
companies. These start-up companies have in some cases accounting figures that result in 
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extreme values on many of the collected ratios. The results from the univariate analysis also 
support the inclusion of possible alternative predictors in a statistical model predicting default. 
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7.2 Logistic regressions 
As a starting point, the SEBRA variables were used in a logistic regression model to predict 
default. The variables of interest is then added to the model one by one to see if the variable 
turns out to be a significant predictor of default. Because the population, and correspondingly 
the final sample of bond issuers in Norway are rather small, the chosen level of significance 
is ten percent. That is, the variables will be interpreted if the p-value is less than ten percent. 
Table 14 shows the logistic regression with the SEBRA variables, adding size to the model, 
adding the share of tangible assets, and correcting for coupon rates and convertibility. 
Table 14 Logistic regressions 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SEBRA-
basic 
Added 
size 
Added 
tangibility 
Added coupon 
rates 
     
Performance -1.969*** -1.395** -1.982*** -1.712** 
 (-2.94) (-2.11) (-2.92) (-2.46) 
     
Equity Ratio 1.105 1.080 1.110 0.855 
 (0.98) (0.94) (0.98) (0.74) 
     
Lost Equity 0.623 0.493 0.630 0.567 
 (1.54) (1.19) (1.55) (1.36) 
     
Liquidity 1.899* 1.985* 1.879* 1.892* 
 (1.70) (1.75) (1.67) (1.69) 
     
Mean Equity Ratio in Industry 4.206 3.635 4.197 4.303 
 (1.21) (1.03) (1.21) (1.23) 
     
Mean Performance in Industry -0.109 -0.0589 -0.105 0.0555 
 (-0.16) (-0.08) (-0.15) (0.08) 
     
Standard Deviation of Performance in Industry -0.0162 -0.0139 -0.0157 0.0158 
 (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.09) (0.09) 
     
Not Matured -1.179** -0.877* -1.192** -1.309*** 
 (-2.55) (-1.82) (-2.53) (-2.68) 
     
Size of Company  -0.357**   
  (-2.32)   
     
Share of Tangible Assets   0.0890  
   (0.14)  
     
Convertible Bond    0.479 
    (0.95) 
     
Coupon    7.144 
    (0.93) 
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.257 0.232 0.239 
Observations 176 176 176 175 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The only variable that turns out to be a significant predictor of default in the SEBRA-basic 
variable model is the performance measure. However, the sign of the coefficient is what you 
would expect and the variable is significant in all of the four different model specifications. 
Consequently, lower performance as measured by ordinary profit after tax relative to the firm’s 
debt level is a significant predictor of failure already at the issue date. The liquidity level also 
turns out to be a significant predictor of failure, although the sign of the coefficient is rather 
surprising. It may be necessary to correct for other variables to get a more logical result 
regarding the liquidity level prior to issuance. The coefficient of the size measure is negative, 
and significant when added to the SEBRA-basic model. The specification with the size 
measure is also the model specification, which gives the highest value of the Pseudo R2 
goodness-of-fit measure. Thus, the model predicts smaller companies to have a higher 
probability of default. This is not surprising if we look at the defaulting companies case by 
case, and is in line with former studies on bankruptcy and default prediction. However, one 
should interpret this variable with some care because it may be necessary to bring in the start-
up characteristics of the firm. 
The classification table of the model including the size measure is provided in table 15. 
Table 15 Classification table SEBRA-basic with size 
  True group   
Classified Defaulted Non defaulted Total 
Defaulted 32 12 44 
Non-defaulted 27 105 132 
Total 59 117 176 
Percentage correct 54,2 % 89,7 % 77,8 % 
Percentage wrong 45,8 % 10,3 % 22,2 % 
 
The classifications are based on a cut of value of 0,5. That is, the specific issuer is classified 
in the default category if the predicted probability of default is greater than 0,5. The choice of 
the optimal cut off value depends on the cost of classifying a defaulted firm wrong, versus to 
the cost of classifying a non-defaulted firm wrong. This issue is not explored further, but is a 
highly relevant question to ask for bond portfolio managers. The model including the size 
measure also provided the best overall classification accuracy by classifying 77,84% of the 
firms correct, but the model is not of much use because it classifies a great deal of the defaulted 
firms wrong. Only 54,24% of the defaulted firms are classified to be in the right group. The 
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overall classification accuracy when using information around the issue date is in line with the 
classification results of the Marchesini, Perdue, and Bryan (2004) study. One alternative way 
to compare the predictive power of the models is to examine the area under the ROC curve. If 
the model has no predictive power, the area under the ROC curve would be 0,5, and  the curve 
will lie close to the 45 degrees straight line. Perfect fit, and classification, would imply an area 
under the ROC curve of 1.The area under the ROC curve for this model specification is 0,8338 
and the graph is depicted in figure 10. As a comparison, the area under the ROC curve 
estimated by the Norwegian Central Bank of Norway was 0,88 applied to the estimation period 
of 1990 to 2002 (Bernhardsen and Larsen, 2007).  
Figure 10 ROC SEBRA-basic with size 
 
The same exercise that was done in table 14 is carried out in table 16, but now the size measure 
is added to the SEBRA variables at instance. The start-up dummy and the crisis dummy are 
then added one by one to the model. The performance measure is again significant across all 
model specification, even when correcting for size, and with the inclusion of the start-up 
dummy. The dummy variable that is supposed to measure if the issue was issued in the wave 
of issues coming up to the financial crisis is significant, and the sign of the coefficient is 
positive. Thus, it seems that some of the companies that issued bonds for the first time coming 
up to the financial crisis were especially risky issuers. This result should of course be 
interpreted with great care because of the financial crisis being a highly unusual event, and 
becomes highly influential when analysing such a short issue period. It is also worth noting 
that the coefficient of the liquidity measure is not statistically different from zero when 
correcting for the issuer being a start-up company or not. 
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Table 16 Logistic regressions 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SEBRA-basic with size Added start-up Added crisis 
    
Performance -1.395** -1.227* -1.674** 
 (-2.11) (-1.90) (-2.47) 
    
Equity Ratio 1.080 1.179 1.292 
 (0.94) (1.02) (1.10) 
    
Lost Equity 0.493 0.421 0.576 
 (1.19) (1.00) (1.32) 
    
Liquidity 1.985* 1.849 1.356 
 (1.75) (1.62) (1.15) 
    
Mean Equity Ratio in Industry 3.635 3.103 1.436 
 (1.03) (0.90) (0.46) 
    
Mean Performance in Industry -0.0589 -0.0201 -0.0666 
 (-0.08) (-0.03) (-0.09) 
    
Standard Deviation of 
Performance in Industry 
-0.0139 0.00205 -0.00876 
 (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.05) 
    
Not Matured -0.877* -0.884* -0.181 
 (-1.82) (-1.83) (-0.32) 
    
Size of Company -0.357** -0.353** -0.323** 
 (-2.32) (-2.30) (-1.97) 
    
Start-up  0.489  
  (1.19)  
    
Crisis   1.560*** 
   (3.29) 
Pseudo R2 0.257 0.264 0.310 
Observations 176 176 176 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The model with the highest Pseudo R2 goodness-of-fit, is the model containing the original 
SEBRA-basic variables including the crisis dummy and the size measure. The model with the 
crisis dummy is of little use when predicting bond defaults in future periods for the same 
reasons as explored earlier. The model including both the measure of size and the start-up 
dummy provides the highest classification accuracy of the three models, with an overall 
classification accuracy of 78,41%. Again, the model fails at classifying the defaulted firms in 
a decent way. 57,63% of the defaulted issuers are classified correctly by the model. The results 
obtained when the start-up dummy is included are slightly better than if the dummy is omitted. 
The classification table of the model is provided in table 17. 
  
 76
Table 17 Classification table SEBRA-basic with size and start-up 
  True group   
Classified Defaulted Non defaulted Total 
Defaulted 34 13 47 
Non-defaulted 25 104 129 
Total 59 117 176 
Percentage correct 57,6 % 88,9 % 78,41 % 
Percentage wrong 42,4 % 11,1 % 21,59 % 
 
The area under the ROC curve for the model including the start-up variable is 0,8340, slightly 
higher than the model which included only the size measure. This ROC curve is depicted in 
figure 11. 
Figure 11 ROC SEBRA-basic with size and start-up 
 
Finally, a stepwise estimation procedure was performed to find the best overall model. This is 
done by starting with all of the proposed explanatory variables, and then removing variables 
that does not provide significantly to the model according to the likelihood-ratio test described 
in chapter six. The chosen level of significance of the likelihood-ratio test is ten percent. The 
variables that make the cut are the SEBRA performance measure, the coupon of the issue 
corrected for the level of interbank interest rates, the dummy variable of issuance coming up 
to the financial crisis, and the dummy for being a convertible bond. All of the variables exhibits 
significant coefficients. The signs of the coefficients are what you would expect from the 
theoretical discussion, and from common economic reasoning. Nevertheless, one should be 
careful with interpreting these results as concluding that the stepwise estimation model is the 
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best overall best model. It is a pure data mining exercise performed on this particular sample, 
and it is unlikely that the same results would have been obtained if performed on a different 
sample, or if the accounting information was collected in a different period of the bonds tenor. 
The regression table for the stepwise estimation procedure is provided in table 18. 
Table 18 Stepwise estimation 
 (1) 
 Stepwise estimation 
  
Not Matured -0.509 
 (-0.93) 
  
Performance -1.872*** 
 (-2.85) 
  
Coupon 24.11*** 
 (2.94) 
  
Crisis 2.488*** 
 (4.52) 
  
Convertible Bond 1.442** 
 (2.47) 
Pseudo R2 0.306 
Observations 175 
z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The predictive relevance of such a model is also of doubt because of the inclusion of the crisis 
dummy. Although the model has the best overall classification accuracy when classifying the 
defaulted issuers, with an classification accuracy of 59,32%, it is not useful when predicting 
default going forward because of the financial crisis dummy. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the overall results from the prediction exercise are rather 
disappointing, and that one should look at this analysis not primarily as a direct prediction 
exercise. Instead, the analysis should be thought of as providing some ideas to which type of 
firms that have fallen into trouble historically. I hope that the logistic regressions, together 
with the univariate assessment, are able shed some light on which characteristics that makes a 
bond issue especially risky in terms of default risk, and can provide some ideas to further 
research on default prediction models.   
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7.3 Criticism 
When preparing the dataset it became clear that the issuing firms were more diverse than first 
thought off. Especially when it comes to their age and the set of information that was possible 
to collect for each firm. The final sample exhibits a mixture of well-established companies, 
and companies that went through an establishment phase around the issue period. Ideally, the 
data quality of some of the firms would have been better, especially for the foreign firms. If a 
larger set of issuers were available, it would have been desirable to draw a random sample 
from the population to estimate a prediction model. The predictive power of the model could 
then have been tested in an out-of sample test with the observations that were not including 
when estimating the model. 
One should be careful with interpreting the results from the regression to literally. First, they 
are based on few observations, a relatively short issue period, and the appropriateness of 
several of the proposed variables as predictors of financial distress on bonds could be further 
debated. The goal of this thesis was to see if financial variables from a statistical credit risk 
model, like the SEBRA model, were any good in predicting default on bonds using 
information available of newly issued bonds, and uncover some basic results between the 
characteristics of the issuers and the risk of defaulting. The results obtained in this thesis must 
be viewed as a supplement to a qualitative assessment of the issuer’s credit quality. The 
diversity of these firms, and the fact that many of these firms had few years of available 
accounting information, could provide some explanation as to the failure of the different model 
specifications in classifying the defaulted and non-defaulted firms correctly.  
Focusing almost solely on accounting information is also a relevant critique to the study. 
Accounting ratios are in essence backward looking and do not reflect expectations of future 
performance. Therefore, a blend of accounting information with information from equity 
markets, and perhaps other financial markets, could have been a boost to the predictive power 
of the model. The lack of publicly available data from the Norwegian bond market, and the 
need to bring in private companies in the analysis, has been challenging in this case.  
Few of the coefficients in the logistic regressions come out as significant. The reason could be 
the already mentioned small sample size, or that it simply is very difficult to find any statistical 
relationship between information gathered around the issue period, and which firms that run 
into trouble. Certainly, a qualitative assessment of the issuers is still needed when performing 
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analysis of default risk. The time period covered is also relatively short, and includes a highly 
unusual event like the financial crisis. It is possible that the period covered is not representative 
going forward due to the financial crisis creating a wave of defaults. It is also worth mentioning 
that the bond market is likely to continue its rapid change in the future, and relationships 
covered from historical data are not necessarily good predictors of failure in future periods 
and for a new set of issuers. 
Certainly, there also exists a time effect in predicting financial distress. Almost every study of 
default, or bankruptcy, prediction reports better results when using information closer to the 
default incident. Although my focus has been on information available at the date of issuance, 
with more time and resources available, information from other periods of the bonds life could 
have been used in a prediction model. It turned out to be difficult to do this in a consistent 
way, and still get a decent size of the final sample. The choice to use information from the 
issue period was made because off the low liquidity in many of the bonds, and in the 
Norwegian bond market in general. It also turned out to be very time consuming to gather 
financial information, because financial information for many of the companies did not appear 
in an available database that was detailed enough to gather the necessary variables.  
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7.4 Conclusion 
Although some problems were confronted during the data collection and the analysis of the 
collected dataset, there are still possible to draw some general conclusions about the 
characteristics that make an issuer more likely to default in the Norwegian High Yield bond 
market. 
From the logistic regressions, one can conclude that companies with lower profits relative to 
their debt exhibits a greater probability of running into trouble with their debt payments, even 
when using available information around the issue date. A possible explanation for this result 
is that start-up companies, and firms in an establishment phase, experience negative profits in 
their first years. These firms are typically smaller and face greater uncertainty around their 
future earnings than older and more established companies face. The results are backed up by 
the significant positive coefficient of the SEBRA size measure, and the significant positive 
coefficient of the start-up dummy. Finally, a model with the SEBRA variables clearly breaks 
down when it comes to classifying the defaulted firms, but performs decent when classifying 
the non-defaulted companies. 
If we consider the stepwise model, issues made coming up to the financial crisis exhibits a 
greater probability of default. This gives some merit to the hypothesis that the large volume 
of issues in 2006 and 2007 included some companies that were especially risky. The 
performance measure from the SEBRA model also proves to be a significant predictor of 
default in the stepwise model. A higher coupon rate, adjusted for the level of interbank rates, 
is a significant predictor of default. The median coupon rate of the bonds that defaults are also 
significantly higher than for the bonds that did not default. This could provide some merit to 
the bond market in assigning the highest coupons to the most risky bonds. These results are 
also significant when correcting for convertible provisions. The stepwise model provides some 
evidence that convertible bonds are more risky in terms of default risk than regular bonds. One 
explanation for this result could be that convertible bonds are typically issued by firms with 
lower profitability, consistent with the findings of Rauh and Sufi (2010) of a negative 
relationship between the profitability of the firm, and the use of convertible bonds from a 
sample of public firms in the United States.   
Focusing solely on the univariate analysis, the typical issue and issuer that defaulted  had lower 
profit margins, are smaller compared to a non-defaulting company, has a higher equity ratio, 
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a higher reservoir of liquid assets compared to its total assets, lower interest expenses to 
EBITDA, a higher coupon, and a higher ratio of issued amount to total assets. Again, some of 
the results are surprising, and some might say absurd. One explanation of the observed results 
regarding the equity ratio, and the different liquidity ratios, could be that it is not appropriate 
to gather financial information from newly started companies prior to their first bond issue. If 
the population of issuers in the Norwegian market had been larger, and if I had access to a 
larger set of financial data, then the sample could have been divided into two. One sample that 
compromised more matured companies, together with one sample that was set up by newly 
started companies.  
For a subsample of 89 public companies, the market-based leverage ratio was calculated. The 
median market-based leverage ratio is significantly higher for the defaulted firms than for the 
non-defaulted firms. This result is the opposite of the result when looking at the equity ratio 
in terms of book value. A possible explanation for this difference could be that the firms that 
were public at the issue date were more matured, and had a more “normal” capital structure, 
than the firms that goes to the bond market in an establishment phase before considering going 
public to raise equity. The market-based leverage is also less distorted by different accounting 
rules than the book equity ratio.  
Further studies should look at how the financial ratios and information from the equity market 
changes when the firms approach default. This could possible provide some warning signs for 
investors from periods after the bond’s issue date. Had a larger group of issuers been available, 
a statistical credit risk model could have been estimated with a random sample of firms, and 
the model could subsequently be up for a predictive power test with a holdout sample. It is 
also of interest to test if a different model specification is better to identify the defaulting firms. 
It would also have been interesting to conduct an analysis when weekly price information is 
available from Nordic Bond Pricing. Then one can compare the implied probabilities from the 
observed credit spreads with predicted probabilities, and loss given default, from a credit risk 
model. An analysis that tries to explain the credit spreads by different variables observed in 
the Norwegian Bond market on a larger set of issuers can then be performed. It is of interest 
to conduct an analysis, which can answer if the investors in the Norwegian bond market 
systematically underestimates the credit risk of the issuers.  
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8. Appendix 
Filtering process: 
Filtering process Bond issues Issuers 
Issue based statistics 12834 865 
After removal of issue types other than regular bonds and convertibles 4332 700 
After removal of Energy, Public sector, Banks, Insurance and other Financial companies 878 341 
After removal of companies owned by the government, unlimited liability etc. 807 317 
After removal of government guaranteed securities etc. 778 314 
After removal of IG companies determined in Brekke & Haugland (2010) 646 270 
Preliminary sample after further adjustments  621 253 
 
Adjustments made to arrive at the preliminary sample: 
Issuer Excluding reason 
Aker ASA Removed issues made by Aker RGI Holding 
Aker Solutions ASA Rated below Investment Grade DNB Markets weekly credit report 35/2013 
APL PLC Use APL ASA instead. Change of jurisdiction after issuance 
Bayerngas Produksjon Norge AS Guaranteed by parent company PA Resources AB 
Cecon ASA First credit event registered by Cecon 1 AS and Cecon 2 AS 
Det Norske Oljeselskap ASA Removed issues made by Aker Exploration AS 
Dof Subsea AS Removed issued by made GEO ASA 
Domstein ASA First credit event noticed by R. Domstein & Co AS 
DP Producer AS Parent FPS Ocean AS bankrupt  
Gamle Holding AS Issue withdrawn just after registration in Stamdata 
Global Investments Group Finance Ltd. Financial company 
Marine Subsea Cyprus Holding Ltd Guaranteed by parent company Marine Subsea AS 
Noreco Norway AS Issuing company Altinex Oil Norway. Already present in final sample 
Northland Resources AB Missing letter in Stamdata 
Northland Resources S.A. Missing letter in Stamdata 
PetroRig III Single Purpose Company. Parent Petromena ASA 
Polarcus Alima AS Single Purpose Company. Parent Polarcus ltd. 
Precise Prediction AS Financial company 
Remedial Cayman Limited 
Credit event noticed by Remedial (Cyprus) Public Company Limited before issue 
date 
Seadrill Norge AS/Smedvig ASA Issues made by Seadrill Norge AS or Smedvig ASA removed 
Tele2 AB Investment Grade DNB Markets weekly credit report 19/2012 
Tordenskjold ASA konkursbo Bankrupt company. No letters in Stamdata 
Transocean Norway Drilling AS Issued as Aker Drilling. Use issues made by Transocean Norway Drilling instead 
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Issuers involved in at least one default: 
Issuer Issuer 
Ability Drilling ASA Neptune Marine Invest AS 
Aker Biomarine ASA Nexus Floating Production Ltd 
Aladdin Oil & Gas Company NOR Energy AS 
American Shipping Company Nordic Heavy Lift ASA 
Apptix ASA Norse Energy Corp. ASA 
Austevoll Seafood ASA Norwegian Energy Company 
B+H Ocean Carrier Ltd. Oceanlink Ltd NUF 
Belships ASA Oceanteam Shipping ASA 
Bergen Group ASA Oren Oil ASA 
Bergen Oilfield Services AS Peterson AS 
Blom ASA Petrojack ASA 
Bluestone Offshore Petrolia ASA 
Camo Software AS Petromena ASA 
Cecon 1 AS and Cecon 2 AS  PetroProd Ltd 
Club Cruise Entart. & Travel. N.V. Primorsk International Shipping Ltd 
Codfarmers R. Domstein & Co AS 
Crew Gold Corp Realkapital European Opportunity AS 
Dannemora Mineral AB Remedial (Cyprus) Public Company Limited 
Delphin Kreuzfahrten GmbH Reservoir Exploration Technology RXT ASA 
Eitzen Chemical ASA Resitec AS 
Eitzen Maritime Services ASA Rocksource ASA 
Emerging Europe Land Develo. Rowan Drilling Norway AS 
EOAL Cyprus Holdings Limited Scan Geophysical ASA 
Equinox Offshore Ltd Seabird Exploration PLC 
Estatia Resort Property AS Sea Production Ltd 
Fairstar Heavy Transport NV SeaMetric International AS 
FPS OCEAN AS Selvaag Bolig ASA 
Front Exploration  AS Sevan Marine ASA 
Funcom N.V. Songa Floating Production ASA 
Hurtigruten ASA Songa Offshore SE 
IBB-Bygg AS Svithoid Tankers  AB 
Ignis ASA Tandberg Data ASA 
Interoil E&P ASA Tandberg Storage ASA 
Krillsea Group AS Thule Drilling AS 
Kverneland ASA TMG International AB 
Malka Oil AB Transeuro Energy Corp 
Marine Accurate Well ASA TTS Group ASA 
Marine Subsea AS Valhall Oil & Gas AS 
Master Marine AS Valiant Petroleum Holdings AS 
Monitor Oil PLC Viking Drilling ASA 
MPF Corp Ltd Wega Mining AS 
MPU Offshore Lift ASA Wentworth Resources Limited 
Nattopharma ASA Ziebel AS 
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Final sample inlcuding issue year and accounting year: 
Name annual report 
Accounting 
year Issuer 
Issue 
year 
ABILITY DRILLING ASA 2006 Ability Drilling ASA 2007 
AKER ASA 2004 Aker ASA 2005 
Aker Biomarine ASA 2006 Aker Biomarine ASA 2007 
AKER SOLUTIONS ASA 2005 Aker Solutions ASA 2006 
AKER YARDS AS 2003 STX Europe AS 2004 
ALADDIN OIL & GAS COMPANY ASA 2006 Aladdin Oil & Gas Company ASA 2007 
ALTINEX ASA 2005 Altinex ASA 2006 
American Shipping Company ASA 2006 American Shipping Company ASA 2007 
APPTIX ASA 2004 Apptix ASA  2005 
ATLANTIC OFFSHORE AS 2011 Atlantic Offshore AS 2012 
AUSTEVOLL SEAFOOD ASA 2006 Austevoll Seafood ASA 2007 
AVANTOR ASA 2002 Avantor AS 2003 
B+H Ocean Carrier Ltd. 2005 B+H Ocean Carrier Ltd. 2006 
BANETELE AS 2002 Banetele AS 2003 
Belships ASA 2005 Belships ASA 2006 
BERGEN OILFIELD SERVICES AS 2007 Bergen Oilfield Services AS 2008 
BLOM ASA 2008 Blom ASA 2009 
BOA OCV AS 2010 Boa OCV AS 2011 
BOA OFFSHORE AS 2011 Boa Offshore AS 2012 
Bonheur ASA 2008 Bonheur ASA 2009 
BORGESTAD ASA 2008 Borgestad ASA 2009 
BW GAS AS 2005 BW Gas AS 2006 
BW Offshore Limited 2011 BW Offshore Limited 2012 
BWG HOMES ASA 2011 BWG Homes ASA 2012 
CALCULUS AS 2005 APL ASA 2006 
CAMO ASA 2006 Camo Software AS 2007 
CECON ASA 2008 Cecon 1 AS and Cecon 2 AS 2009 
CERMAQ ASA 2011 Cermaq ASA 2012 
Codfarmers ASA 2006 Codfarmers ASA 2007 
COLOR GROUP ASA 2003 Color Group AS 2004 
CRUDECORP ASA 2011 Crudecorp ASA 2012 
DALANE BREIBAND AS 2011 Dalane Breiband AS 2012 
DANA PETROLEUM NORWAY AS 2006 Dana Petroleum Norway AS 2007 
Dannemora Mineral AB 2010 Dannemora Mineral AB 2011 
DEEP SEA SUPPLY ASA 2005 Deep Sea Supply ASA 2006 
DEEPOCEAN AS 2005 Deepocean AS 2006 
DET NORSKE OLJESELSKAP ASA 2010 Det Norske Oljeselskap ASA 2011 
DFDS A/S 2011 DFDS A/S 2012 
DISCOVER PETROLEUM AS 2007 Front Exploration AS 2008 
DNO ASA 2003 DNO International ASA 2004 
Dockwise Ltd. 2006 Dockwise Ltd. 2007 
DOF ASA 2002 DOF ASA 2003 
DOF SUBSEA ASA 2006 Dof Subsea AS 2007 
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DOLPHIN GROUP ASA 2011 Dolphin Group ASA 2012 
DOMSTEIN ASA 2009 R. Domstein & Co AS 2010 
DSB 2008 DSB 2009 
Eitzen Chemical ASA 2006 Eitzen Chemical ASA 2006 
ELECTROMAGNETIC GEOSERVICES AS 2005 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 2006 
EMERGING EUROPE LAND DEVELOPMENT AS 2010 Emerging Europe Land Development AS 2011 
EMS SEVEN SEAS ASA 2006 EMS Seven SEAS ASA 2007 
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. 2007 Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. 2008 
FARSTAD SHIPPING ASA 2004 Farstad Shipping ASA 2005 
FJELLSTRAND AS 2007 Fjellstrand AS 2008 
Floatel International Ltd. 2011 Floatel International Ltd. 2012 
FPS Ocean AS 2007 FPS OCEAN AS 2008 
Fram Exploration ASA 2010 Fram Exploration ASA 2011 
FRED OLSEN ENERGY ASA 2000 Fred Olsen Energy ASA 2001 
FREDENSBORG AS 2011 Fredensborg AS 2012 
FRONTIER DRILLING ASA 2000 Frontier Drilling AS 2001 
Frontline Ltd 2009 Frontline Ltd. 2010 
Funcom N.V. 2010 Funcom N.V. 2011 
GLAMOX ASA 2003 Glamox ASA 2004 
GLOBAL RIG COMPANY ASA 2010 Global Rig Company ASA  2011 
Golar LNG Ltd 2011 Golar LNG Ltd. 2012 
Golar LNG Partners LP 2011 Golar LNG Partners LP 2012 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd. 2006 Golden Ocean Group Ltd. 2007 
GRIEG SEAFOOD ASA 2008 Grieg Seafood ASA 2009 
HAVILA AS 2010 Havila AS 2011 
HAVILA SHIPPING ASA 2005 Havila Shipping ASA 2006 
HEXAGON COMPOSITES ASA 2005 Hexagon Composites ASA 2006 
HOST HOTELEIENDOM AS 2010 Host Hoteleiendom AS 2011 
Höegh LNG Holdings Ltd. 2011 Höegh LNG Holdings Ltd. 2012 
I. M. Skaugen SE 2006 I. M. Skaugen SE 2007 
IGNIS ASA 2005 Ignis AS 2006 
INTEROIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION ASA 2005 Interoil Exploration and Production ASA 2006 
J. Lauritzen A/S 2009 J. Lauritzen A/S 2010 
Jason Shipping ASA 2004 Jason Shipping ASA 2005 
Jasper Investments Limited 2010 Jasper Explorer Plc 2011 
Kistefos AS 2011 Kistefos AS 2012 
KRAGERØ FJORDBÅTSELSKAP AS 2004 Kragerø Fjordbåtselskap AS 2005 
KVERNELAND AS 2006 Kverneland AS 2007 
Lightstream Resources Ltd. 2009 Lightstream Resources Ltd. 2010 
LOFOTENS OG VESTERAALENS DAMPSKIBSSELSKAB 
ASA 2003 Hurtigruten ASA 2004 
London Mining Plc 2006 London Mining Plc 2007 
Lotos Exploration and Production Norge AS 2008 
Lotos Exploration and Production Norge 
AS 2009 
M PETERSON & SØN AS 2005 Peterson AS 2006 
MARACC - Marine Accurate Well ASA 2007 MARACC - Marine Accurate Well ASA 2007 
Marine Subsea AS 2007 Marine Subsea AS 2007 
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MERKANTILBYGG HOLDING AS 2011 Merkantilbygg Holding AS 2012 
METALLKRAFT AS 2009 Resitec AS 2010 
Monitor Oil Plc 2006 Monitor Oil Plc 2007 
MORPOL ASA 2010 Morpol ASA 2011 
MOSKING BOLIG AS 2011 Mosking Bolig AS 2012 
MPF Corp Ltd. 2006 MPF Corp Ltd. 2006 
NATTOPHARMA ASA 2008 Nattopharma ASA 2009 
NERA ASA 2005 Eltek ASA 2006 
NEXTGENTEL HOLDING ASA 2005 Nextgentel Holding ASA 2006 
Nexus Floating Production Ltd. 2006 Nexus Floating Production Ltd. 2007 
NJORD GAS INFRASTRUCTURE AS 2010 Njord Gas Infrastructure AS 2011 
NORDIC MINING ASA 2006 Nordic Mining ASA 2006 
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER ASA 2003 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 2004 
NORTECHS FPSO ASA 2006 Songa Floating Production ASA 2007 
North Atlantic Drilling Limited 2011 North Atlantic Drilling Limited 2011 
Northern Offshore Ltd. 2006 Northern Offshore Ltd. 2007 
NORTHERN OIL ASA 2004 Norse Energy Corp. ASA 2005 
NORWEGIAN AIR SHUTTLE ASA 2006 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 2007 
NORWEGIAN CAR CARRIERS ASA 2005 Norwegian Car Carriers ASA 2006 
Norwegian Energy Company ASA 2006 Norwegian Energy Company ASA 2007 
OCEAN RIG ASA 1999 Ocean Rig ASA 2000 
Ocean Rig UDW Inc. 2010 Ocean Rig UDW Inc. 2011 
Ocean Yield ASA 2011 Ocean Yield ASA 2012 
Oceanteam Shipping ASA 2006 Oceanteam Shipping ASA 2007 
Odfjell SE 2004 Odfjell SE 2005 
OLYMPIC SHIP AS 2010 Olympic Ship AS 2011 
OREN OIL ASA 2006 Oren Oil ASA 2006 
OSX Brasil S.A. 2011 OSX 3 Leasing B.V  2012 
OTIUM AS 2011 Otium AS 2012 
PA Resources AB 2004 PA Resources AB 2005 
Pacific Drilling S.A. 2011 Pacific Drilling S.A. 2012 
PAN FISH ASA 2002 Marine Harvest ASA 2003 
Panoro Energy ASA 2009 Panoro Energy ASA 2010 
Petrobank Energy and Resources Ltd. 2006 Petrobank Energy and Resources Ltd. 2007 
PETROJACK ASA 2005 Petrojack ASA 2006 
Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 2006 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 2007 
PETROLIA DRILLING ASA 2004 Petrolia ASA 2005 
PETROMENA AS 2005 PetroMena ASA 2006 
Petrominerales Ltd. 2006 Petrominerales Ltd. 2007 
Polarcus Ltd. 2008 Polarcus Ltd. 2008 
PROSAFE ASA 2003 Prosafe SE 2004 
REALKAPITAL EUROPEAN OPPORTUNITY AS 2010 Realkapital European Opportunity AS 2011 
REM OFFSHORE ASA 2009 Rem Offshore ASA 2010 
RENEWABLE ENERGY CORPORATION AS 2004 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 2005 
Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 2006 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 2007 
ROCKSOURCE ASA 2006 Rocksource ASA 2007 
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ROXAR AS 2007 Roxar AS 2008 
SAFETEL AS 2003 Safetel AS 2004 
SCAN GEOPHYSICAL AS 2005 Scan Geophysical ASA 2006 
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) 2004 Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) 2005 
SCHIBSTED ASA 2009 Schibsted ASA 2010 
Seabird Exploration Plc 2005 Seabird Exploration Plc 2006 
Seadrill Ltd. 2006 Seadrill Ltd 2007 
SEKTOR GRUPPEN AS 2011 Sektor Gruppen AS 2012 
Sevan Marine ASA 2006 Sevan Marine ASA 2007 
Ship Finance International Limited 2009 Ship Finance International Limited 2010 
SINOCEANIC SHIPPING ASA 2011 SinOceanic II AS 2012 
SINVEST ASA 2004 Sinvest AS 2005 
SOFTWARE INNOVATION AS 2005 Software Innovation AS 2006 
SOLSTAD OFFSHORE ASA 2005 Solstad Offshore ASA 2006 
Songa Offshore SE 2006 Songa Offshore SE 2007 
SPECTRUM ASA 2010 Spectrum ASA 2011 
Stena Metall AB 2010 Stena Metall Finans AB 2011 
STEPSTONE ASA 2005 Axel Springer Norway AS 2006 
Stolt-Nielsen Limited 2010 Stolt-Nielsen Limited 2011 
Svithoid Tankers AB 2005 Svithoid Tankers AB 2006 
SYNNØVE FINDEN ASA 1999 Synnøve Finden AS 2000 
TANDBERG DATA ASA 2005 Tandberg Data ASA 2006 
TANDBERG STORAGE ASA 2007 Tandberg Storage ASA 2008 
Teekay Corporation 2011 Teekay Corporation 2012 
TELIO AS 2005 Telio Holding ASA 2006 
THULE DRILLING ASA 2005 Thule Drilling AS 2006 
TiZir Ltd. 2011 TiZir Ltd. 2012 
TMG International AB 2005 TMG International AB 2006 
TRANSOCEAN NORWAY DRILLING AS 2010 Transocean Norway Drilling AS 2011 
TTS GROUP ASA 2006 TTS Group ASA 2007 
UMOE INDUSTRI AS 2005 Umoe AS 2006 
VIKEN FIBERNETT AS 2006 Viken Fibernett AS 2007 
Viking Drilling 2006 Viking Drilling ASA 2006 
Viking Supply Ships A/S 2011 Viking Supply Ships A/S 2012 
VILLA ORGANIC AS 2007 Villa Organic AS 2008 
VISMA ASA 2003 Visma AS 2004 
VMETRO ASA 2005 Vmetro ASA 2006 
VOLSTAD MARITIME AS 2005 Volstad Maritime AS 2006 
WEGA MINING AS 2006 Wega Mining AS 2007 
Wentworth Resources Limited 2005 Wentworth Resources Limited 2006 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA 2003 Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA 2004 
ZIEBEL AS 2007 Ziebel AS 2008 
 
Note: Names appearing under name annual report with only capital letters are annual reports 
retrieved from the SNF database. 
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Issuers excluded due to unavailable financial data: 
Issuer Issuer 
Aberdeen Bergerveien 12 AS Middle East Jackup I Company 
Aberdeen Eiendom Holding Norden/ Baltikum AS Mosvold Drilling Ltd. 
Atlantic Oilfield Services Ltd. Mosvold Supply Plc 
Bassdrill Alpha Ltd. MPU Offshore Lift ASA 
Bergen Group ASA Navigator Holdings Ltd. 
Bluestone Offshore Pte Ltd. Neptune Marine Invest AS 
Bluewater Holding B.V.  NOR Energy AS 
Chloe Marine Corporation Ltd. Nordic Heavy Lift ASA 
Club Cruise Entertainment & Travelling Services Eu Oceanlink Ltd NUF 
COSL Drilling Europe AS Offshore Heavy Transport AS 
COSL Drilling Semi AS Onetwocom AB (publ) 
Crew Gold Corp Oro Negro Drilling Pte. Ltd. 
Davie Holding AS PetroProd Ltd. 
DDI Holding AS Primorsk International Shipping Ltd. 
Deep Drilling 1 Pte. Ltd. Remedial (Cyprus) Company Limited 
Deep Drilling 7 Pte. Ltd. and Deep Drilling 8 Pte. Rowan Drilling Norway AS 
Deep Sea Bergen Invest AS Rubicon Offshore Holdings 
Delphin Kreuzfahrten Sea Production Ltd. 
Didon Tunisia Ltd. SeaDragon Offshore Ltd. 
Eastern Drilling ASA Seametric International AS 
Eastern Echo Holding Plc Selvaag Bolig ASA 
Enovation Resources Ltd. Sevan Drilling Invest AS 
EOAL Cyprus Holdings Limited Siem Industries Inc 
Equinox Offshore Accomodation Limited Skdp 1 Ltd. 
Estatia Resort Property AS Skøyen Næringsbygg AS 
Floatel Superior Ltd. Solstad Rederi II AS 
Fram Eiendom AS Solør Bioenergi Infrastruktur AS 
Frigstad Discoverer Invest Ltd. (BVI) Standard Drilling ASA 
Geopard A/S Sølvtrans Rederi AS 
Golden Close Maritime Corp Ltd. Teekay LNG Partners LP 
Hambo Ab Oy Teekay Offshore Partners LP 
Heritage Oil Corp Teodin Acquico AS 
IBB Byg AS Transeuro Energy Corp 
Indekshuset Holding AS TrollDrilling & Services Ltd. 
KCA DEUTAG Offshore AS Valhalla Oil and Gas AS 
Krillsea Group AS Valiant Petroleum Holdings AS 
LK Holding I AS Vann AS 
Malka Oil AB Venture Drilling AS 
Master Marine AS  
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Annual reports 
Link to annual reports, reporting year, and access date. 
Aker Biomarine ASA (2006): 
<http://www.akerbiomarine.com/section.cfm?path=142,161> (16.10.2013) 
B+H Ocean Carrier Ltd. (2005): 
http://www.bhocean.com/files/BHO032206.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Belships ASA (2005): 
http://hugin.info/17/R/1045535/171335.pdf (11.10.2013) 
BW Offshore Limited (2011): 
http://hugin.info/136844/R/1598893/504326.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Codfarmers ASA (2007): 
http://www.codfarmers.com/content/fin_rep_annual_docs/docs/00016_1153588835_Annual
_report_2007_english.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Dannemora Mineral AB (2010): 
http://mb.cision.com/Main/6282/9380170/98872.pdf (16.10.2013) 
DFDS A/S (2011): 
http://www.dfdsgroup.com/Investors/Reports/Documents/Annual%20Report%202011_uk_fi
nal.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Dockwise Ltd. (2006): 
http://www.dockwise.com/page/financial-reports.html (11.10.2013) 
DSB (2009): 
http://ipaper.ipapercms.dk/DSB/fakta/DSBKoncernrsrapport/DSBKoncernrsrapport2009/ 
(16.10.2013) 
Eitzen Chemical ASA (2006): 
http://hugin.info/137124/R/1132191/211651.pdf (16.10.2013) 
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Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V (2008): 
http://www.fairstar.com/media/Homepage/2%20-%20Investors/1%20-
%20Publications/2008%20FHT%20Annual%20Report%2020090302.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Floatel International Ltd. (2011): 
http://www.floatel.se/filer/FIL_Annual_Report_2011.pdf (11.10.2013) 
FPS Ocean AS (2007): 
http://otc.nfmf.no/public/news/8654.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Fram Exploration ASA (2010): 
http://www.framexploration.no/assets/files/financial/Annual%20Report%202010.pdf 
(11.10.2013) 
Frontline Ltd. (2009): 
http://hugin.info/182/R/1399130/382765.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Funcom N.V. (2010): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=281374&searchCriteria.fromDate=
01.10.2001&searchCriteria.toDate=16.10.2013&searchCriteria.issuerId=7997&searchCriteri
a.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&searchCriteria.oamMandatoryO
nly=f (16.10.2013) 
Golar LNG Ltd. (2011): 
http://www.golarlng.com/media/2011_Annual_Report_Form_20-F_(1).pdf (16.10.2013) 
Golar LNG Partners LP (2011): 
http://www.golarlngpartners.com/index.php?name=seksjon%2FStock_Exchange_Releases%
2FAnnual_Reports.html (16.10.2013) 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd. (2006): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=145672&selectedPagenumber=2&s
earchCriteria.fromDate=01.10.2001&searchCriteria.toDate=16.10.2013&searchCriteria.issu
erId=7823&searchCriteria.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&search
Criter (16.10.2013) 
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Höegh LNG Holdings Ltd. (2011): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=304003&searchCriteria.fromDate=
01.10.2001&searchCriteria.toDate=16.10.2013&searchCriteria.issuerId=11251&searchCrite
ria.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&searchCriteria.oamMandatory
Only= (16.10.2013) 
I. M. Skaugen SE (2006): 
http://www.skaugen.biz/annualreports/2006/ (24.10.2013) 
J. Lauritzen A/S (2009): 
http://www.j-l.com/upload/annual_report_2009_uk_final_lores_.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Jason Shipping ASA (2006): 
http://hugin.info/135041/R/1078168/185921.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Kistefos AS (2011): 
http://www.kistefos.no/filer/Kistefosgroup2011-Norwegian.pdf (16.10.2013) 
London Mining Plc (2007): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=205984&searchCriteria.fromDate=
01.10.2001&searchCriteria.toDate=11.10.2013&searchCriteria.issuerId=8397&searchCriteri
a.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&searchCriteria.oamMandatoryO
nly=f (16.10.2013) 
Lotos Exploration and Production (2008): 
http://inwestor.lotos.pl/en/971/reports_and_key_data/annual_reports (16.10.2013) 
MARACC - Marine Accurate Well ASA (2007): 
http://www.maracc.no/doc/Maracc_annualreport_2007.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Marine Subsea AS (2006): 
http://otc.nfmf.no/public/news/8981.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Monitor Oil Plc (2006): 
http://otc.nfmf.no/public/news/6183.pdf (11.10.2013) 
MPF Corp Ltd. (2006): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=149663&searchCriteria.fromDate=
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01.12.2000&searchCriteria.toDate=17.12.2013&searchCriteria.issuerId=100001184&search
Criteria.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&searchCriteria.oamManda
toryOnly=false&searchCriteria.currentVersionOnly=false&searchCriteria.activeIssuersOnly
=false&searchCriteria.osloMarketOnly=false (16.10.2013) 
Nexus Floating Production Ltd. (2007): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=201349&selectedPagenumber=2&s
earchCriteria.fromDate=17.12.2000&searchCriteria.toDate=17.12.2013&searchCriteria.issu
erId=8279&searchCriteria.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&search
Criteria.oamMandatoryOnly=false&searchCriteria.currentVersionOnly=false&searchCriteri
a.activeIssuersOnly=false&searchCriteria.osloMarketOnly=false (16.10.2013) 
Nordic Mining ASA (2006): 
http://www.nordicmining.com/getfile.php/Filer/Investors/Financial%20Reports/Reports%20
2006/annualreport2006.pdf (16.10.2013) 
North Atlantic Drilling Limited (2011): 
http://www.nadlcorp.com/stream_file.asp?iEntityId=1364 (16.10.2013) 
Northern Offshore Ltd. (2007): 
http://library.corporate-
ir.net/library/15/157/157788/items/289370/NOF_Consol%20FS2007.w.auditreport.pdf 
(16.10.2013) 
Norwegian Energy Company ASA (2006): 
http://www.noreco.com/Documents/FInancial%20reports%20NO/Annual%20report%20200
6_no.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Ocean Rig UDW Inc (2011): 
http://ocean-rig.irwebpage.com/files/orig20f12.pdf (16.10.11) 
Ocean Yield ASA (2011) 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=324142&searchCriteria.fromDate=
24.10.1999&searchCriteria.toDate=24.10.2013&searchCriteria.issuerId=11316&searchCrite
ria.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&searchCriteria.oamMandatory
Only=false&searchCriteria.currentVersionOnly=false&searchCriteria.activeIssuersOnly=fal
se&searchCriteria.osloMarketOnly=false (16.10.2013) 
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Oceanteam Shipping ASA (2006): 
http://www.newsweb.no/newsweb/search.do?messageId=152372&selectedPagenumber=2&s
earchCriteria.fromDate=01.10.2000&searchCriteria.toDate=11.10.2013&searchCriteria.issu
erId=8229&searchCriteria.categoryId=122&searchCriteria.infoRequiredOnly=false&search
Criter (11.10.2013) 
Odfjell SE (2004): 
http://hugin.info/156/R/987161/147546.pdf (16.10.2013) 
OSX Brasil S.A. (2011): 
http://ir.osx.com.br/ShowResultado.aspx?IdResultado=01cUXzwCx0bGZvOvfwQ70g== 
(16.10.2013) 
PA Resources AB (2004): 
http://www.paresources.se/upload/%c3%85rsredovisningar/PARAnnualReport2004sv.pdf 
(11.10.2013) 
Pacific Drilling S.A. (2011): 
http://www.pacificdrilling.com/files/2011%2020-F_v001_p4uunz.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Panoro Energy ASA (2010): 
http://www.panoroenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/20110415-Annual-Report-2010-
Final1.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Petrobank Energy and Resources Ltd. (2006): 
http://www.petrobank.com/files/408.2006-AR.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Petroleum Geo-Services ASA (2006): 
http://www.pgs.com/upload/40374/PGS%20NGAAP%202006%20Lowres.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Petrominerales Ltd. (2006): 
http://www.petrominerales.com/files/92.PMG-2006-MDA.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Polarcus Ltd. (2008): 
http://issuu.com/polarcus/docs/plcs-ar-08?viewMode=magazine&mode=embed (16.10.2013) 
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) (2004): 
http://www.sasgroup.net/SASGROUP_IR/CMSForeignContent/2004eng.pdf (11.10.2013) 
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Seabird Exploration Plc (2005): 
http://hugin.info/136336/R/1042262/169962.pdf (11.10.2013) 
Seadrill Ltd. (2006): 
http://www.nadlcorp.com/stream_file.asp?iEntityId=1364 (16.10.2013) 
Sevan Marine ASA (2006): 
http://www.sevanmarine.com/images/stories/Reports/Annual/Arsrapport_2006.pdf 
(11.10.2013) 
Ship Finance International Limited (2009): 
http://www.shipfinance.bm/reports/134876/R/1400502/355834.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Songa Offshore SE (2006): 
http://www.songaoffshore.com/Reports/Songa%20Offshore%20Annual%20report%202006
%20(Norwegian).pdf (11.10.2013) 
Stolt-Nielsen Limited (2010): 
http://asp-gb.secure-zone.net/v2/indexPop.jsp?id=624/759/2548&lng=en (16.10.2013) 
Teekay Corporation (2011): 
http://www.teekay.com/files/doc_financials/annual/Dec11%2020F%20TKC%20FINAL_v0
01_u6b4dh.pdf (16.10.2013) 
TiZir Ltd. (2012): 
http://www.tizir.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/TiZir-Limited-signed-FS-@-31-12-
2012-final2.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Viking Drilling ASA (2006): 
http://otc.nfmf.no/public/news/6361.pdf (16.10.2013) 
Viking Supply Ships A/S (2012): 
http://www.vikingsupply.com/event/doLink/FAMID/295854 (16.10.2013) 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA (2003): 
http://www.wilhelmsen.com/about/invest/reports/Documents/2003%20Årsrapport.pdf 
(25.10.2013) 
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Annual reports were extracted from the Orbis database for the following companies: 
 American Shipping Company ASA 
 Jasper Investments Limited 
 Lightstream Resources Ltd. 
 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 
 Svithoid Tankers AB 
 TMG International AB 
 Wentworth Resources Limited 
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